Court Review 55:2 (20190- Whole Issue by unknown
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
Court Review: The Journal of the American 
Judges Association American Judges Association 
2019 
Court Review 55:2 (20190- Whole Issue 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/ajacourtreview 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the American Judges Association at 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Court Review: The Journal 
of the American Judges Association by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - 
Lincoln. 
Court Review
T H E  J O U R N A L  O F  T H E  A M E R I C A N  J U D G E S  A S S O C I A T I O N
ARTICLES 
56 Sniffer-dog Searches in the United States
Eve M. Brank, Jennifer L. Groscup, Emma Marshall & Lori Hoetger
62 Toward a Judiciary Both Independent and Accountable
Robert H. Tembeckjian
68 Responsibility, Respect, Temperance, and Honesty: Selected State 
Judicial Discipline Cases in 2018
Cynthia Gray
DEPARTMENTS 
50 Editor’s Note
51 President’s Column
52 Thoughts from Canada 
Crossword 
80 The Resource Page
EDITORS
Professor Eve Brank
University of Nebraska
Judge David J. Dreyer
Marion Superior Court
Indianapolis, IN
Judge David Prince
Colorado State District Court
MANAGING EDITOR
Charles F. Campbell
National Center for State Courts
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Terra Garay
EDITORIAL BOARD
Kelly Lynn Anders
Kansas City, Missouri
Chief Judge Karen Arnold-Burger
Kansas Court of Appeals
Pamela Casey, Ph.D.
National Center for State Courts
Judge B. Michael Dann
National Institute of Justice
Judge Julie Kunce Field
Fort Collins, Colorado
Judge John Irwin
Nebraska Court of Appeals
Judge Leslie G. Johnson
American Institute for Justice
Steven Lubet
Northwestern University
Judge Gregory E. Mize
Washington, D.C.
Elizabeth Neeley, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska
David Rottman, Ph.D.
National Center for State Courts
Professor Alan Tomkins
University of Nebraska
DESIGN
Michael Fairchild
m-Design Studio
T A B L E  O F  C O N T E N T S
Volume 55, Issue 2
79
In addition to our recurring columns, this issue focuses on odors and ethics.We start with AJA president Robert Torres, Jr.’s final column as presidentproviding an informative overview of recent AJA accomplishments. Thank
you, Judge Torres, for your past and future leadership and service to AJA. Next
we hear from our regular Canadian columnist, Judge Wayne Gorman. An inter-
esting irony occurred in planning this issue. When we heard from Judge
Gorman that his column would address Canadian developments regarding
searches using sniffer dogs, we learned that one of our editors, Prof. Eve Brank,
was working on an article addressing developments in the United States regard-
ing sniffer dogs. Prof. Brank kindly accelerated her article so that we could pre-
sent them as complementary pieces in this issue. Regardless of your legal
system, you will find a review of the similarities and differences in the
approaches to these points of analysis pre-
sented by these two articles.  
Next, we hear from Robert Tembeckjian, the
administrator and counsel of the New York
State Commission on Judicial Conduct. Mr.
Tembeckjian has decades of experience in judi-
cial ethics and judicial disciplinary commis-
sions. He is one of the leading speakers on
issues of judicial ethics. We asked Mr. Tem-
beckjian to share with you his observations
and insights drawn from his decades of work
with our peer judges and guarding the
integrity of the judiciary. We think you will find the results fascinating.
Speaking of judicial ethics, we asked our regular ethics columnist, Cynthia
Gray, director of the Center for Judicial Ethics, to do something a little differ-
ent for this issue. Many of our readers may not know that Ms. Gray provides a
regular service by reporting on judicial ethics decisions across the United
States. We and many judges have found a regular review of her reports invalu-
able components of our learning how to be a judge and how to navigate the
critical ethical restrictions that preserve the credibility and integrity of the judi-
ciary. We asked Ms. Gray to depart from her usual topical column to give you
a taste of this valuable resource she regularly provides outside the pages of
Court Review. Ms. Gray’s closing line says it beautifully, “Reading about others’
missteps may help judges navigate ethically when almost everything they do
has the potential for a cringe-worthy headline.” Readers dedicated to quality
professional judging will want to incorporate a review of these reports as part
of their routine.—David Prince
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unso-
licited, original articles, essays, and book reviews. Court
Review seeks to provide practical, useful information to
the working judges of the United States and Canada. In
each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to be encountered by
many judges, or by providing background information
(such as psychology or other social science research)
that can be used by judges in their work. Guidelines for
the submission of manuscripts for Court Review are set
forth on page 61 of this issue. Court Review reserves the
right to edit, condense, or reject material submitted for
publication.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Shelley Rockwell at (757) 259-1841.
The cover piece was created by Frank Perez, a local
Guam artist, and features the Guam Judicial Center. The
Judiciary is comprised of both the Superior Court of
Guam and the Supreme Court of Guam. The Guam Judi-
cial Center was constructed in 1991 to accommodate the
expansion of court operations, and the establishment of
specialty courts, as well as to meet the needs of Guam’s
growing population. 
©2019, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States. Court Review is published quarterly by
the American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member
subscriptions are available for $35 per volume (four
issues per volume). Subscriptions are terminable at the
end of any volume upon notice given to the publisher.
Prices are subject to change without notice. Second-
class postage paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and addi-
tional mailing offices. Address all correspondence about
subscriptions, undeliverable copies, and change of
address to Association Services, National Center for
State Courts, Williamsburg, Virginia 23185-4147.
Points of view or opinions expressed in Court Review
are those of the authors and do not necessarily repre-
sent the positions of the National Center for State
Courts or the American Judges Association. ISSN:
0011-0647.
Cite as: 55 Ct. Rev. ___ (2019).
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Dear colleagues and Court Review readers!
This is the last column I will write as your president, and it
has been an honor and a privilege to serve. Besides planning our
well-renowned educational programs, over the past year, we
focused on strengthening our committees by keeping them
active and meeting regularly—whether in person at our confer-
ences or through the numerous phone calls that spanned nine
time zones and the International Date Line. We have been com-
mitted to bolstering membership while collaborating and part-
nering with other organizations to provide excellent educational
opportunities. We continue to encourage diversity throughout
our organization, and offer wellness and judicial family support
to our members. 
In April, we wrapped up our midyear meeting in Savannah,
Georgia, where we partnered with the National Association of
Drug Court Professionals (NADCP) to provide
education sessions on Effective Judicial Practices
and Court Interventions for Defendants with Sub-
stance Use Disorders and Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence Initiatives. The NADCP’s Chief Executive
Officer Carson Fox, Chief Operating Officer Ter-
rence Walton, and Board of Directors Chair
Michael Barrasse were panelists for the sessions,
along with California Judge Richard Vlavianos.
The National Judicial College also aligned with
our efforts by providing a pre-conference course
on Advanced Bench Skills: Procedural Fairness. It
was a successful midyear meeting, and the efforts
of Mary Celeste in getting the commitment from NADCP and
NJC cannot be overlooked. 
We are excited about our 59th Annual American Judges
Association’s Educational Conference in September, which will
be a joint conference with the Supreme Court of Illinois Judicial
College. The venue for the 2019 annual conference is the his-
toric Drake Hotel in downtown Chicago, and we will be joined
by 100 judges from the home state. The educational programs
will examine issues that impact the administration of justice,
judicial decision making, and emerging legal topics. On the list
of social activities is a Chicago Cubs baseball game and the 5-
star guided architecture cruise of the historic Chicago River. The
2019 Joint Conference Workgroup composed of AJA and Illi-
nois members spent considerable time over the last year plan-
ning the education and social activities for what promises to be
another successful program. I want to thank all Workgroup
members for their contributions and specially recognize the
efforts of Illinois Judge Neil Cohen and Anita C. Shore, J.D., of
the Illinois Judicial Education Division. 
Our education and conference committees have traditionally
been the most active committees but because of the dynamic
chairs and co-chairs, other standing committees are being more
involved through frequent teleconference meetings and routine
collaboration. The Judicial Wellness Committee chaired by
Joseph Rossi helped develop content for a presentation on well-
ness and mindfulness by the former Director of the Federal Judi-
cial Center, Judge Jeremy Fogel, and Judge Gerald Lebovits. The
Court Security committee, co-chaired by Eugene Lucci and
Natalie Tyrell, are developing educational programs on personal
judicial security and sovereign citizens issues for the 2020
Philadelphia conference. Jerrauld Jones, Tracy Brandeis-Roman,
and Mangesh Duggal of the Criminal and Juvenile Justice com-
mittee are also working on topics for future conferences. The
Diversity Committee, chaired by Yvette Alexander and Roxanne
Song Ong, organized a presentation on Deliberative Decision
Making that will be presented at the National Bar Association
Judicial Council meeting in July and at the AJA Annual Confer-
ence in September. 
Another committee that has been active is our Membership
Committee co-chaired by Judge Elliott Zide. The committee has
launched a new membership development campaign with
strategies for attracting new members, restoring dropped mem-
bers, and reducing attrition of members.  
We have much to look forward to with our
cross-cultural educational exchange to Cuba in
February 2020, the AJA 2020 midyear meeting in
Napa, the 2020 annual meeting in Philadelphia,
the 2021 midyear meeting in San Antonio, Texas
and the 2021 annual meeting in New Orleans
jointly with the Louisiana Judicial College. Your
participation in these conferences enhances AJA’s
diverse membership, which is the strength of our
organization. Our efforts to promote and improve
the effective administration of justice will only get
easier as our committees strengthen and grow.
Our future president will have an amazing year—just as I did—
because of the support, camaraderie, and capable group of
judges within our organization. AJA strives to find exciting and
adventurous ways to bring its members together for educational
advancement, networking, and peer mentoring to “Make Better
Judges.” 
By the time this column is published, the Supreme Court will
have completed its first term with the current group of justices.
Some of these cases involve fundamental questions of citizen-
ship and political participation. This includes Lamone v.
Benisek, where the Court will review lower-court orders that
Maryland must redraw its congressional district maps due to
partisan gerrymandering, and Department of Commerce v. New
York, which considers whether the 2020 census can include
questions about citizenship that opponents allege will under-
mine Latino participation. The Court will also consider more
technical questions, such as whether courts should defer to an
agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regula-
tion (Auer deference), at issue in Kisor v. Wilke. The decisions
in these cases and others will shape our nation and our courts
for years to come. 
Finally, to memorialize my last President’s Column I
requested the cover of Court Review be a painting of the Guam
Judicial Center done by a retiring court employee and local
artist Frank Perez. I hope you enjoy it, and I thank you all for
allowing me to serve. I have become a better justice and court
leader because of you.
Robert J. Torres, Jr.
President’s Column
Footnotes
1. I became aware of this article because of it being posted by Judge
Kevin Burke in his blog (see blog.amjudges.org/). 
In Who’s a Good Boy? U.S. Supreme Court Considers AgainWhether Dog Sniffs Are Searches (Justic, January 16, 2019),Professor Sherry F. Colb notes that the United States
Supreme Court “is currently considering whether to grant
review in Edstrom v. Minnesota.” She indicates that this “pre-
sents the issue whether police must obtain a search warrant
before bringing a trained narcotics dog to sniff at a person’s
door for illicit drugs.” Professor Colb’s article goes on to con-
sider prior occasions in which the Supreme Court of the
United States has considered the constitutionality of searches
though dog sniffing.1
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court denied the
application for certiorari in Edstrom v. Minnesota (2019 WL
888181). As a result, it will not be considering the dog-sniff
issue raised in that case. 
Professor Colb’s article made me think about the law of dog-
sniffing-related searches in my country. As a result, in this
column, I intend to look at how the use of sniffer-dogs searches
has been addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada.  
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s initial consideration of this
issue came in the companion cases of R. v. Kang-Brown, 2008
SCC 18, and R. v. A.M., 2008 SCC 19.  The issue was framed
in the context of whether the use of the sniffer dogs in these
cases constituted a search and if so, whether the search was
reasonable in the context of section 8 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982. That section
of the Charter states:
Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable
search or seizure.
SECTION 8 OF THE CHARTER
In Canada, section 8 of the Charter has been interpreted
such that “the ‘search or seizure’ question reduces to whether
the act intruded on the claimant’s ‘reasonable expectation of
privacy’. If not, there was no ‘search or seizure’ and no viola-
tion of section 8” (see Steven Penney, The Digitization of Sec-
tion 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution? (2014), 67 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 505, at paragraphs 6 to 8). In R. v. Spencer, 2 S.C.R. 212,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that a “sniffer dog provides
information about the contents of the bag and therefore
engages the privacy interests relating to its contents” (at para-
graph 47).  
In the Canadian context, a violation of section 8 of the
Charter can lead to exclusion of evidence pursuant to section
24(2) of the Charter, which states:
Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that
infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed
by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all of the circum-
stances, the admission of it in the proceedings would
bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
R. V. KANG-BROWN
In Kang-Brown, a police officer involved in an operation
designed to detect drug couriers at bus stations approached the
accused, identified himself, and asked the accused if he was
carrying narcotics. The accused said no. The officer then asked
to look in the accused’s bag. Another officer with a sniffer dog
approached. The dog sat down, indicating the presence of
drugs in the bag. The accused was searched and drugs were
found on his person and in his bag. 
The trial judge found that the accused was neither arbitrar-
ily detained nor unlawfully searched and entered a conviction.
The Alberta Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. An appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
R. V. A.M. 
In A.M., the police used a sniffer dog to search a school for
the presence of drugs. In a gymnasium, the sniffer dog reacted
to an unattended backpack. The police, without obtaining a
search warrant, opened the backpack and found illicit drugs.
The trial judge excluded the evidence and acquitted the
accused. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal. An
appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
WHAT APPROACH DID THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA TAKE?
In each of these decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada
was divided and three judgments were filed in each instance.
As a result, determining the ratio discendi can be difficult.
Interestingly, many years later, the Supreme Court suggested in
Spencer that while it was “divided on other points, it was
unanimous in holding that the dog sniff of Mr. Kang-Brown’s
bag constituted a search” (at paragraph 29). In R. v. Aucoin, 3
S.C.R. 408 (2012), the Supreme Court indicated that in Kang-
Brown it “recognized a common law power to conduct sniffer
THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN
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dog searches” (at paragraph 76). Finally, in R. v. MacDonald, 1
S.C.R. 37 (2014), the Court indicated that in Kang-Brown “a
majority of the Court recognized a common law power to con-
duct sniffer-dog searches” (at paragraph 32).
It appears that a majority of the Court in A.M. and Kang-
Brown concluded as follows:
1. A dog’s sniffing constitutes a search for the purposes
of section 8 of the Charter; and
2. The use of sniffer dogs is lawful based upon the
common-law powers of the police to investigate
crime. 
Five years after these two decisions were rendered, the
Supreme Court of Canada returned to the issue of the use of
sniffer dogs. Once again, it rendered two judgments (R. v.
Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, and R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50).
However, this time the majority decisions are readily ascer-
tainable.
R. V. CHEHIL
In Chehil, the police checked the accused’s airplane luggage
by utilizing a drug detection dog. The dog gave a positive indi-
cation for the scent of drugs. The accused was arrested and his
luggage was searched. Three kilograms of cocaine was found. 
At the commencement of her decision in Chehil, Justice
Karakatsanis, writing for the entire Court, succinctly explained
what it had decided in A.M. and Chang-Brown (at paragraph 1):
The Court concluded that the use of a properly
deployed drug detection dog was a search that was
authorized by law and reasonable on a lower threshold of
“reasonable suspicion”. Because they are minimally
intrusive, narrowly targeted, and can be highly accurate,
sniff searches may be conducted without prior judicial
authorization. 
The Supreme Court also indicated that the appeal required
it “to elaborate on the principles underlying the reasonable
suspicion standard and its application.” This elaboration
resulted in the Supreme Court holding that the police can use
a drug detection dog without obtaining prior judicial autho-
rization if they have a “reasonable suspicion” based on objec-
tive, ascertainable facts, that evidence of an offence will be dis-
covered through the utilization of the dog. The Court indi-
cated that the “reasonable suspicion standard requires that the
entirety of the circumstances, inculpatory and exculpatory, be
assessed to determine whether there are objective ascertainable
grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in criminal
behaviour” (at paragraph 6).
The Supreme Court also indicated in Chehil that reasonable
suspicion “derives its rigour from the requirement that it be
based on objectively discernible facts, which can then be sub-
jected to independent judicial scrutiny. While reasonable
grounds to suspect and reasonable and probable grounds to
believe are similar in that they both must be grounded in
objective facts, reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, as it
engages the reasonable possibility, rather than probability, of
crime.… As a result, when applying the reasonable suspicion
standard, reviewing judges must
be cautious not to conflate it with
the more demanding reasonable
and probable grounds standard”
(at paragraphs 26 and 27).
However, the Court also indi-
cated that a constellation of fac-
tors “will not be sufficient to
ground reasonable suspicion
where it amounts merely to a
‘generalized’ suspicion because it ‘would include such a
number of presumably innocent persons as to approach a sub-
jectively administered, random basis’ for a search’… Indeed,
the reasonable suspicion standard is designed to avoid indis-
criminate and discriminatory searches” (at paragraph 30). The
Court also held that a “nexus must exist between the criminal
conduct that is suspected and the investigative technique
employed. . . . In the context of drug detection dogs, this nexus
arises by way of a constellation of facts that reasonably sup-
ports the suspicion of drug-related activity that the dog
deployed is trained to detect” (at paragraph 36).
Finally, the Court held in Chehil that the onus is on the
Crown “to show that the objective facts rise to the level of rea-
sonable suspicion, such that a reasonable person, standing in
the shoes of the police officer, would have held a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.” The Court pointed out that “the
reliability of a particular dog is also relevant to determining
whether a particular sniff search was conducted reasonably in
the circumstances” (at paragraph 45).
THE CONCLUSION IN CHEHIL
The Supreme Court indicated that when a sniffer dog deliv-
ers a positive indication, the police may arrest the suspect if
they have reasonable and probable grounds to do so. If the
arrest is valid, the police may conduct a search to secure evi-
dence without prior judicial approval. The Court stated that
this “is what occurred in this case” (at paragraph 55).
The Court concluded in Chehil that “considering the
strength of the constellation of factors that led to the decision
to deploy the dog, the reliability of the dog, and the absence of
exculpatory explanations, the positive indication raised the
reasonable suspicion generated by the constellation to the level
of reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused” (at
paragraph 76).  
R. V. MACKENZIE 
In MacKenzie, the accused was charged with possession of
a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking. The
police had stopped the accused’s vehicle for speeding. After the
vehicle was stopped, the investigating officer suspected that
the accused was involved in illegal drug activity. He detained
the accused and then utilized a drug detection dog to conduct
a perimeter search of the vehicle, resulting in a “positive” reac-
tion by the dog. The police arrested the accused and searched
his vehicle incident to the arrest. Thirty-one pounds of mari-
huana was found.
At the commencement of his reasons in McKenzie, Justice
Moldaver, writing for the majority of the Court, referred to Jus-
tice Karakatsanis’s reasons in Chehil, and indicated that her
[S]niff searches
may be 
conducted 
without prior
judicial 
authorization.
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“efforts have spared me the heavy
lifting in this case, as the broader
questions that I have just men-
tioned are fully canvassed in her
reasons.” He then indicated: “I
therefore concentrate here on the
application of the reasonable suspi-
cion standard to the facts of this
case. I also address certain addi-
tional issues that arise in the con-
text of a sniffer-dog search that
occurs subsequent to a roadside stop, as occurred here. The
Court did not address those issues in Kang-Brown and A.M.
and the facts of this case present an occasion for clarification
of the applicable principles” (at paragraph 3). 
SNIFFER DOGS AND MOTOR VEHICLES
Justice Moldaver noted in McKenzie that the Court “has
held that motor vehicles, though emphatically not Charter-free
zones, are places in which individuals have a reasonable but
‘reduced’ expectation of privacy. . . . The privacy context here
is thus analogous to the bus terminal in Kang-Brown and the
school in A.M., where the use of police sniffer dogs on the
basis of reasonable suspicion was found to pass Charter
muster. As a result, I am satisfied that the police here were enti-
tled to enlist the aid of a sniffer dog for crime prevention on
the same basis” (at paragraph 31).
WHAT IS REASONABLE SUSPICION?
The Court pointed out in McKenzie that reasonable suspi-
cion “must be assessed against the totality of the circum-
stances. Characteristics that apply broadly to innocent people
and ‘no-win’ behaviour—he looked at me, he did not look at
me—cannot on their own, support a finding of reasonable sus-
picion, although they may take on some value when they form
part of a constellation of factors” (at paragraph 71). However,
the Court also pointed out that “while it is critical that the line
between a hunch and reasonable suspicion be maintained to
prevent the police from engaging in indiscriminate or discrim-
inatory practices, it is equally vital that the police be allowed
to carry out their duties without undue scepticism or the
requirement that their every move be placed under a scanning
electron microscope” (at paragraph 65).
Justice Moldaver explained the concept of “reasonable sus-
picion” in the following manner (at paragraphs 73 and 74):
Assessing whether a particular constellation of facts
gives rise to a reasonable suspicion should not—indeed
must not—devolve into a scientific or metaphysical
exercise. Common sense, flexibility, and practical every-
day experience are the bywords, and they are to be
applied through the eyes of a reasonable person armed
with the knowledge, training and experience of the
investigating officer.
Parenthetically, I note that there are several ways of
describing what amounts to the same thing. Reasonable
suspicion means “reasonable grounds to suspect” as dis-
tinguished from “reasonable grounds to believe” (Kang-
Brown, at paras. 21 and 25, per Binnie J., and at para.
164, per Deschamps J.). To the extent one speaks of a
“reasonable belief” in the context of reasonable suspi-
cion, it is a reasonable belief that an individual might be
connected to a particular offence, as opposed to a rea-
sonable belief that an individual is connected to the
offence. As Karakatsanis J. observes in Chehil, the
bottom line is that while both concepts must be
grounded in objective facts that stand up to independent
scrutiny, “reasonable suspicion is a lower standard, as it
engages the reasonable possibility, rather than probabil-
ity, of crime” (para. 27).
THE CONCLUSION IN MCKENZIE
The Supreme Court concluded in McKenzie that “the police
had reasonable suspicion that the appellant was involved in a
drug-related offence such that they could enlist Levi to per-
form a sniff search of the appellant’s vehicle. The appellant’s s.
8 privacy rights were not breached and the marihuana seized
from the rear hatch of his car was thus admissible at trial” (at
paragraph 91).
A SUMMARY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA’S
DECISIONS
As we have seen, it is well settled in Canada that the use of
a sniffer dog constitutes a search that is protected by section 8
of the Charter. However, it is also well settled that Canadian
police can use sniffer dogs to search without prior judicial
authorization if they have the requisite reasonable suspicion.
In addition, if a Canadian police officer has reasonable and
probable grounds to arrest as a result of the use of a sniffer dog,
that officer can conduct a search incidental to the arrest. This
search does not require prior judicial authorization and
extends beyond a search of the person arrested (see R. v. Saeed,
1 S.C.R. 518). However, none of the cases decided by the
Supreme Court of Canada involved residences. 
The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that the constitu-
tionality of sniffer-dog searches are based on two primary fac-
tors: (1) the reliability of such searches and (2) their non-inva-
sive nature. In addition, the Court’s granting of constitutional
validity to such searches was based upon the police having rea-
sonable suspicion. In Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superin-
tendent of Motor Vehicles), 3 S.C.R. (2015) 250, the Court noted
that “a high degree of accuracy has been crucial to endorsing
sniffer-dog searches on a lower standard of reasonable suspi-
cion” (at paragraph 67). 
It has been suggested by one author that the Supreme Court
has set the “standard for a sniff search in these kinds of loca-
tions” as a “possibility—not probability.” A standard “justified
by the minimally intrusive nature of sniff searches” (see Sonia
Lawrence, 2013: Constitutional Cases in Review (2014), 67
S.C.L.R. (2d) 3, at paragraph 51). 
In R. v. Zolmer, 2019 ABCA 93, the Alberta Court of Appeal
described these types of searches as examples of “air searches,”
which are not considered to be “intrusive” (at paragraph 32). In
R. v. Jackman, 2016 ONCA 121, it was noted that a “dog sniff is
minimally invasive on an individual’s privacy interests” (at
paragraph 26). In addition, the Supreme Court of Canada has
not limited dog-sniffer searches to border searches. The power
is broad enough to search at schools and in motor vehicles.
[T]he use of a
sniffer dog
constitutes a
search that is
protected by
section 8 of
the Charter.
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2. In R. v. Leipert (1997) 1 S.C.R. 281, the Court dealt with an
appeal in which, after receiving a tip from a Crime Stoppers pro-
gram, a police officer went to the accused’s residence with a snif-
fer dog and on “four different occasions the policeman and Bruno
walked the street in front of Leipert’s residence. Each time Bruno
indicated the presence of drugs in Leipert’s house.” The police
then obtained a search warrant. The “main allegations raised in
support of the warrant were the observations of the police officer
at the site.” When the search warrant was executed, evidence was
seized and the appellant was charged with cultivation of mari-
juana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, the appeal concerned disclosure
of the Crime Stoppers tip rather than the use of the dog’s reaction
to obtain a search warrant.
Where else it will be expanded to, if anywhere, waits to be seen. 
Despite their non-intrusive nature, the use of sniffer dogs
must comply with section 8 of the Charter. Thus, for a search
based upon the use of a sniffer dog to be reasonable, the police
must have reasonable grounds to suspect that a search will
reveal evidence of a criminal offence. This will depend, in part,
on the reliability of the dog utilized. In Goodwin, the Supreme
Court stated that the “reliability of a search or seizure mecha-
nism is directly relevant to the reasonableness of the search or
seizure itself.” The Court also indicated that the “high degree
of accuracy” involved in sniffer-dog searches was “crucial to
endorsing sniffer-dog searches on a lower standard of reason-
able suspicion” (at paragraph 67). Thus, the dog effectively
becomes the Crown’s most important witness. The dog’s “qual-
ifications” are an important element. 
CONCLUSION
Though the Supreme Court of Canada’s rulings in the dog-
sniff cases has provided Canadian police with a broad consti-
tutional search power, it is not an unlimited one. Consider R.
v. Molnar, 2018 MBCA 61, and R. v. Urban, 2017 ABCA 436.
These decisions illustrate that though reasonable suspicion is a
low standard, it must be objectively established and that it only
applies to the dog sniff, not any subsequent searches.
In Molnar, the accused was charged with the offence of pos-
session of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The police
had utilized a sniffer dog to test a suitcase in the baggage car
of a train. A positive reaction was obtained. The suitcase had
no identification. The accused was arrested, and the suitcase
was searched. Drugs were found and connected to her. The
trial judge ruled that the police had reasonable grounds to
arrest the accused and that the searches were incidental to her
arrest. The accused was convicted.
On appeal, the Manitoba Court of Appeal overturned the
conviction. The Court of Appeal noted that the “hit on the grey
suitcase by Bernie was compelling information that elevated
Constable Kristalovich’s reasonable suspicion that the grey
suitcase contained marijuana to reasonable grounds to believe
(subjectively and objectively) that it did.” However, the police
did not connect the bag to the accused before arresting her.
This led the Court of Appeal to hold that there “was no evi-
dence that the grey suitcase in question was the only grey suit-
case in the baggage car bound for Washago. While the evi-
dence was strong to establish a reasonable suspicion, particu-
larly after Bernie’s positive hit on the grey suitcase, in contrast
to the cases cited above, the required strong connection
between the grey suitcase and the accused for the RCMP to
have objective reasonable grounds to arrest her did not exist”
(at paragraph 35).
In Urban, the accused was convicted of the offence of pos-
sessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. The convic-
tion was based upon evidence found by the police after deploy-
ing a sniffer dog to search the exterior of his vehicle. 
In setting aside the conviction, the Alberta Court of Appeal
indicated that though the “reasonable suspicion standard has
become a low bar particularly since Chehil and MacKenzie,”
the totality of the evidence did not support the officer’s “sub-
jective belief that Mr. Urban might be involved in a drug-
related offence. . . . Consequently, he lacked authority at
common law to detain Mr. Urban for the purpose of a con-
trolled substance investigation and to conduct a sniffer dog
search of the exterior of Mr. Urban’s vehicle, thereby breaching
Mr. Urban’s rights under s 9 (arbitrary detention) and s 8
(unreasonable search and seizure) of the Charter” (at para-
graph 44). 
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Canada has considered
sniffer-dog searches and given them their constitutional bless-
ing, but only at the initial investigative stage. Their use to
search residences has not been considered. As the Supreme
Court noted in MacKenzie, relying in part on a decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, this case does not “involve
the use of sniffer dogs in contexts such as the home, where
courts have long recognized a heightened privacy interest (see,
e.g., R. v. Evans, 1 S.C.R. 8; Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409
(2013).”2
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular
column (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely published.
Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
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We present here a complement to Judge WayneGorman’s article on the law of sniffer-dog searchesin Canada found on page 52. Similar to Judge
Gorman’s article, we examine U.S. Supreme Court cases about
the use of police dogs in searches. 
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue of dog
sniffs in U.S. v. Place1 pursuant to the Fourth Amendment pro-
tection from unreasonable government searches and seizures
and requirements for obtaining a search warrant.2 We start
with a brief historical3 reminder of Fourth Amendment case
law to provide context for current sniffer-dog questions. Next,
we provide an overview of U.S. Supreme Court cases that have
addressed what role sniffer dogs should have in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. 
A BRIEF FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY 
The Fourth Amendment was born out of the American Rev-
olution with historians pointing to the colonists’ protests
against English writs of assistance as the spark that fired the
revolution.4 The writs of assistance allowed no specific suspi-
cion or pointed location for a search. Rather, the British offi-
cials could search businesses and homes with very little delay.5
Desiring not to return to life like they experienced under
British rule, the framers of the Bill of Rights included the
Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures. For more than a century, no caselaw directly
focused on the Fourth Amendment.6 Near the turn of the
twentieth century, the Supreme Court in Weeks v. United States7
excluded evidence obtained by law enforcement who did not
have a warrant but still went into a home and seized papers
that implicated the defendant in a federal crime. In a unani-
mous decision, the Court developed what is known as the
Exclusionary Rule and excluded the evidence because the
papers were illegally obtained. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States8 the Exclusionary Rule was extended to evidence
that was obtained because of illegally acquired information.9
The primary goal of the Exclusionary Rule is to disincentivize
government officials from ignoring the law to search and seize
evidence that they could not lawfully obtain. In other words,
the rule is meant to “prevent, not to repair.”10
How are law enforcement agents to behave so they do not
have their evidence excluded? For almost 200 years, defining
a search or seizure rested on the common understanding of
physical intrusions.11 But, in 1967, the Court rejected the
physical trespass requirement detailed in earlier cases and
instead focused on a new understanding of Fourth Amend-
ment rights in Katz v. United States.12 Justice Harlan’s widely
relied upon concurring opinion outlined a two-prong test for
determining when the Fourth Amendment protections are trig-
gered. In the first prong, the question is whether the individ-
ual claiming an expectation of privacy had an actual, subjec-
tive expectation that the searched area or item was private. In
the second prong, the question is whether that subjective
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as rea-
sonable. The Supreme Court has applied the Katz logic in a
variety of places finding that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to searches involving the police digging through garbage
at the curb,13 wired police informants,14 bank-maintained
account records,15 a pen register on a telephone that records
the phone numbers called,16 or the area beyond the curtilage of
a home.17
In addition to the reasonableness clause, the Fourth
Amendment also includes the Warrant Clause. The plain lan-
guage of the Warrant Clause provides that a search should not
occur without a warrant. Nonetheless, the Court in United
States v. Rabinowitz18 held that warrants are unnecessary if a
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search is reasonable and conducted during a lawful arrest.
Importantly, the Court in Rabinowitz said there was no “fixed
formula”19 for determining reasonableness and defaulting to
always requiring a warrant is not appropriate. Instead, the
Court held that reasonableness would be determined in light of
the case facts and circumstances. Accordingly, the Court later
found that a search incident to an arrest is reasonable within
the “grabbable area.”20 More importantly, Terry v. Ohio21 held
that a police officer could stop and frisk a suspect looking for
weapons when the officer had a “reasonable suspicion” that
the person is engaged in criminal activity. The police do not
need a warrant and they do not need to have probable cause to
arrest the suspect, but their intrusions on individuals should
still be limited. 
When police engage in technology-aided investigations it
provides the Court with new case facts and circumstances to
consider. For example, in 2001, the Court in Kyllo v. United
States22 held that obtaining illegal drug-growing data from
thermal imaging was a Fourth Amendment search and the offi-
cers should have had a search warrant. The Court in Kyllo
seemed concerned with the efficiency of data collection from
the thermal imaging device and the fact that such a device
would not be commonly available to those not in law enforce-
ment. In a similar vein, law enforcement sniffer dogs are a spe-
cial type of searching technology. A frequently used means of
obtaining probable cause to search is a “sniff” for the presence
of illegal items such as explosives, cadavers, and drugs.23 In
these instances, the trained dog’s “alert” to the presence of
drugs frequently becomes the “probable cause” that serves as
the justification to conduct a warrantless search lawfully.24 In
fact, this practice is so widespread and common in American
policing that officers have been known to refer to dog-sniff
tests as “walking probable cause” or “probable cause on a
leash.”25 The following sections will detail the U.S. Supreme
Court caselaw in chronological order that has addressed such
sniffer dogs. 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SNIFFER DOGS
U.S. V. PLACE26
Dog Sniff of Luggage Is Not a “Search”
When preparing to board his plane in Miami for New York
City, Raymond Place’s behavior attracted the attention of law
enforcement agents. Because he was preparing to board his
flight, the Miami agents alerted drug enforcement agents in
New York where Place was detained upon arrival. After Place
did not consent to a search of his luggage, the agents told him
they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to obtain
a search warrant. The officers then took the luggage to a differ-
ent New York airport where they subjected the luggage to a sniff
test by a trained narcotics detection
dog. The dog positively alerted to
the presence of narcotics in one of
the bags. Approximately 90 minutes
had elapsed from taking the bags
from Place to the dog at the other
airport. Because it was late on a
Friday afternoon, the officers kept
the luggage and secured a search
warrant on Monday morning at
which point they found cocaine in one of the bags. Place argued
that the warrantless seizure of his bag was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. At issue was whether based on reasonable
suspicion law enforcement could temporarily detain Place’s lug-
gage and subject it to a trained narcotics detection dog. 
The Supreme Court held that the officers’ lengthy seizure
and detention of the luggage exceeded the permissible bounds
set forth in Terry27 In dicta, the Court noted that the dog’s sniff
did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. The Court stated that there must always be a bal-
ance between “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the impor-
tance of the governmental interests.”28 Despite the substantial
government interest in detecting narcotics, the Court held that
the police violated Place’s Fourth Amendment rights when
they seized his luggage for 90 minutes and because of such a
lengthy seizure, the evidence obtained from the subsequent
search was inadmissible. Although arguably not a question
before them,29 the Court noted that the dog sniff was not a
search. They described the dog sniff of that luggage as unique
given that the dog was only trained to detect narcotics and was
able to sniff the bag while it was closed and all its contents
could remain private. The Court heralded the dog-sniff proce-
dure as limited in both manner and the information obtained
and not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. 
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS V. EDMOND30
Dog Sniff Is Less Intrusive Than a Search
Almost two decades after Place, the Supreme Court again
had a case before them that involved narcotic-sniffing canines
when a city’s roadblock checkpoints were in question. The city
of Indianapolis was operating vehicle checkpoints to find ille-
gal drugs in passing cars. Cars were stopped without any rea-
sonable suspicion or probable cause, but simply because they
were at the checkpoint. Once a car was stopped, one officer
would walk a narcotics-sniffing dog around the car to deter-
mine if the dog would alert to the scent of drugs. Two stopped
motorists brought a lawsuit on behalf of the class of stopped
motorists because they felt their Fourth Amendment Rights
A frequently
used means 
of obtaining
probable cause
to search is a
“sniff”. . . .
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were violated. Although the
Supreme Court noted that similar
checkpoints are permissible when
they are set up to increase highway
safety (e.g., verifying drivers’
licenses, drunk driving tests) or
are related to specific border secu-
rity issues, the Supreme Court
held in Edmond that checkpoints
to simply detect general illegal
activity are not. However, the Court again endorsed the dicta
in Place that a canine sniff was not a Fourth Amendment
search saying, “Just as in Place, an exterior sniff of an automo-
bile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to
disclose any information other than the presence or absence of
narcotics. Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that
simply walks around a car is much less intrusive than a typical
search.”31 However, the question remained: “What privacy
interests are implicated by a drug-sniffing dog?” 
ILLINOIS V. CABALLES32
Random Dog Sniffing OK for Traffic Stop Citation
Roy Caballes was speeding down an Illinois interstate when
a state trooper pulled him over. A second trooper who was part
of the Police Drug Interdiction Team overheard the stop infor-
mation on the police dispatch and immediately proceeded to
the stop location with his narcotics-sniffing dog. While the
first trooper was in his squad car to finish issuing a warning
ticket for Caballes, the second trooper walked the dog around
the exterior of Caballes’ car. The dog alerted to the trunk of the
car, which led to a search of the trunk where the officers found
marijuana that led to a narcotics conviction for Caballes. 
Caballes argued the drug evidence should be excluded
because even though the whole incident only took 10 minutes,
the officers did not have specific and articulable facts related to
drugs that would have justified a drug-sniffing dog. Relying on
the uniqueness of dog sniffs as detailed by Place, the Supreme
Court held that the dog sniff in this instance did not violate
Caballes’ Fourth Amendment rights. They noted that using a
well-trained narcotics-detection dog does not infringe upon
legitimate privacy rights because the Court did not believe the
dog sniff changed the lawful character of a traffic stop. 
Both Justices Souter and Ginsberg wrote separate dissenting
opinions. Justice Souter’s dissent rested on the idea that
because research had demonstrated that even well-trained nar-
cotics-sniffing dogs have between a 12.5% to 60% false positive
rate, they are clearly not infallible. If the dogs are not infallible,
then Justice Souter reasoned, the sniff cannot be used without
probable cause since the officers did not have reasonable sus-
picion to conduct the additional search in the first place. Jus-
tice Ginsberg’s dissent focused on the need for reasonable sus-
picion to conduct this secondary search. She was less con-
cerned with the length of the search rather the lack of reason-
able suspicion before bringing in the drug-sniffing dog. 
FLORIDA V. HARRIS33
A Certified Dog Is Reliable Enough
Florida police officer William Wheetley was on a routine
patrol with his narcotics-sniffing dog, Aldo, when he pulled
over Clayton Harris for an expired license plate. Harris
appeared nervous to Officer Wheetley and had an open beer
can inside his truck. Officer Wheetley asked if he could search
Harris’s truck, but Harris refused. At this point, Officer Wheet-
ley brought Aldo out of the patrol car and walked him around
Harris’s truck. Aldo alerted to Harris’s driver’s-side door
handle. Using the alert as probable case, Officer Wheetley
searched Harris’s truck, and although he did not find any nar-
cotics (i.e., drugs that Aldo was trained to detect), he did find
a variety of items that were indicative of manufacturing
methamphetamine (i.e., meth). Officer Wheetley arrested him
and Harris confessed to making and using meth. Out on bail
from this first offense, Harris was again pulled over by the
same Officer Wheetley and Aldo—this time for a broken brake
light. Aldo again alerted to the same door handle, but this time
Officer Wheetley did not find anything during his search of
Harris’s truck. 
The Supreme Court in reviewing the Harris case examined
the question of what factors should be considered in deter-
mining a narcotics-sniffing dog’s reliability. The Court noted
that the reliability of the dog can be demonstrated by factors
such as the training and certification the dog has received
while minimizing the importance of field performance in reli-
ability analysis. Justice Kagan delivering the unanimous deci-
sion stated that “evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in
a certification or training program can itself provide sufficient
reason to trust his alert. If a bona fide organization has certi-
fied a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a
court can presume (subject to any conflicting evidence
offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search.
The same is true, even in the absence of formal certification, if
the dog has recently and successfully completed a training pro-
gram that evaluated his proficiency in locating drugs.”34 The
Court did note that even if a dog was generally reliable, there
could be surrounding circumstances that could undermine
probable cause from a particular alert. Some examples the
Court provided were the officer cuing the dog (consciously or
unconsciously) or if the dog was working in unfamiliar condi-
tions. The Court reasoned that none of those exceptions
applied for Aldo and there was no reason to believe that Aldo
was not reliable. As the court stated, Aldo’s “sniff is up to
snuff.”35
FLORIDA V. JARDINES36
The Court Shortens the Leash at Homes
The Supreme Court heard Florida v. Jardines with the Harris
case on October 31, 2012. The decisions for both cases came
down about five weeks apart in February and March of 2013.
Where Harris is about a dog sniffing a vehicle, Jardines is about
a dog sniffing the porch of a home. Based on a tip that mari-
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juana was being grown in the home of Joelis Jardines, two
detectives and a trained narcotic-sniffing dog approached Jar-
dines’s home. The dog alerted at the base of the front door,
which prompted the detective to obtain a search warrant. The
ensuing search of Jardines’s home revealed marijuana plants.
At issue for the Supreme Court was whether the dog sniffing
the front porch was a search under the Fourth Amendment.
Although the previous outlined cases seem to suggest that the
Supreme Court is giving a long leash to narcotic-sniffing dogs,
the Court in Jardines shortens the leash. That line is the private
home. In their holding that the dog sniff on Jardine’s front
porch was an unlawful warrantless search, the majority rely on
the fact that the officers were within the curtilage of the home
and the property rights inherent in one’s home. Justice Kagan
in her concurring opinion went a step further and analogized
the police dog to high-powered binoculars being used to look
inside a home through its windows. She concluded such would
not only be a trespass on a person’s property, but also an inva-
sion of person’s privacy. With this, Justice Kagan reinforced the
idea that trained sniffer dogs are powerful instruments not
available for general public use.37
RODRIGUEZ V. U.S.38
Dogs Can’t Sniff on Routine Traffic Safety Stops
Switching back to dogs sniffing cars, Justice Ginsburg deliv-
ered the majority opinion for Rodriguez. A Nebraska police
officer, Morgan Struble, pulled Dennys Rodriguez over after
witnessing Rodriguez swerve onto the shoulder of the high-
way. Struble is a K-9 officer and had his narcotics-sniffing dog
with him in his car. Rodriguez explained that he swerved to
miss a pothole. After issuing a formal warning to Rodriguez,
Officer Struble then asked if he could walk his dog around the
vehicle. Rodriguez refused consent, so Officer Struble
instructed Rodriguez to get out of his vehicle while they waited
for a second officer. After the second officer arrived, Officer
Struble took the dog around Rodriguez’s vehicle twice with the
dog alerting halfway through the second trip. Approximately
eight minutes had passed since the issuing of the warning and
the dog alerting. The majority focused on the fact that the
extension of the traffic stop for the dog sniff occurred after the
conclusion of the traffic stop, or in other words after the warn-
ing was issued, rather than the length of the extension. In
relaying the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted that the
police are not permitted to extend the duration of a traffic stop
without reasonable suspicion, even if it is only a minimum
amount of time. The use of a drug-sniffing dog, the Court rea-
soned, is for detecting criminal activity and is not part of a rou-
tine traffic stop meant to ensure vehicle safety on the roads. 
SUBSEQUENT LOWER-COURT DECISIONS
In the years since Jardines and Rodriguez, lower courts have
been confronted with a crop of
new issues in analyzing sniffer-
dog searches. The Minnesota
Supreme Court recently deter-
mined that, unlike a sniff of a
home’s front porch in Jardines,
use of a drug-sniffing dog in a
hallway immediately adjacent to
an apartment was not an uncon-
stitutional search.39 The Minnesota Supreme Court distin-
guished the apartment complex from the situation in Jardines,
clarifying that, “The area immediately adjacent to [the defen-
dant’s] apartment door is not analogous to the front porch in
Jardines because it is located in an internal, common hallway
that other tenants and the police jointly use and access.”40
The Colorado Supreme Court also departed from U.S.
Supreme Court reasoning when evaluating a drug-sniffing dog
search of a vehicle in People v. McKnight.41 Previous drug-sniff-
ing-dog-search opinions had relied on the reasoning in Place
that the use of a drug-sniffing dog does not implicate a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy because these dogs only sniff
out illegal activity, but Colorado legalized marijuana under
their state constitution in January 2014. The Colorado
Supreme Court had previously held a positive alert of a drug-
sniffing dog could be used to support a finding of probable
cause to search a vehicle.42 But, according to the Colorado
Supreme Court most recently, because individuals can lawfully
possess marijuana in the state of Colorado, drug-sniffing dogs
are similar technology to the use of a thermal-imaging device
the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed in Kyllo.43 The Colorado
Supreme Court went on to hold that, because a sniff from a dog
trained to detect marijuana can reveal lawful activity, that sniff
is a search under the state constitution and must be justified by
probable cause.44
Sniffer dogs can detect contraband other than drugs, and an
appellate court in Massachusetts was confronted with one such
type of search in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Devoe.45 In
that case, police officers were investigating a report of a female
suspect with a firearm at a local park. The officers responded
with their sniffer dog who had been trained to detect firearms.
The dog positively alerted to the presence of a firearm in a bag
and the defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a
firearm for not having a permit. The defendant argued the dog
sniff of her bag was unconstitutional. Similar to the Colorado
Supreme Court’s reasoning in McKnight, the Massachusetts
appellate court distinguished the firearm sniff because such a
sniff reveals potentially noncriminal activity (e.g., carrying a
concealed weapon with a valid permit). But the appellate court
did not reach the question of whether the sniff was an unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment and instead
deemed the search unconstitutional on other grounds.
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RESEARCH CONTINUES
Although the Court has held that dog sniffs are not searches
requiring probable cause, empirical research on the issue has
found that participants rated the intrusiveness of a dog sniff
similarly to a frisk, which the Court has held to be a search.46
Additionally, Chicago Tribune reporters Dan Hinkel and Joe
Mahr found that law enforcement dogs across a three-year
period were less than 50% accurate in accurately detecting
drugs or drug paraphernalia.47 The accuracy of the dog sniff
seems to impact how invasive their sniff is perceived. In two
separate studies, Professor Jane Bambauer told law students or
lay people the accuracy of the dog was either 100%, 99%, or
90%.48 The participants’ perception of the dog’s invasiveness
increased as the accuracy decreased. In other words, the less
accurate the dog was, the more invasive the sniff was perceived
to be. Professor Bambauer also found that participants were
more likely to think a dog sniff was a search when the sniff
target was a house compared to a car.49
Despite these findings, empirical questions remain about
public perceptions of police dogs and their sniffs. For example,
based on the Supreme Court attention to the issue, we have
examined a variety of locations beyond the simple car versus
home comparison. Our research indicates that more privacy is
expected for a home than for other types of living situations,
such as an apartment or hotel room, and that, contrary to Bam-
bauer’s findings and court assumptions, people might expect
an equivalent, high amount of privacy in their cars and their
homes.50 Similar to Bambauer, we found that a dog’s accuracy
can affect perceptions of the dog’s reliability.51 We also investi-
gated how quality of training and certification can impact per-
ceptions of the dog’s reliability (two of the issues raised in
Harris). We found that reliability perceptions were not influ-
enced by the quality of ongoing training the dog receives,
despite the fact that training was emphasized by the Court and
that higher-quality, continued training might actually improve
a dog’s reliability. However, current certification did increase
perceptions of the dog’s reliability. 
Additionally, we investigated the issues raised in Rodriguez
by varying whether a traffic stop was extended to conduct a
dog sniff or question the driver about drugs, whether the
extension to the traffic stop occurred before or after the ticket
was issued, and the length of time the traffic stop was extended
(2, 7, or 17 minutes). Consistent with the Court’s reasoning
that a dog sniff exceeds the ordinary type of investigation nec-
essary for a traffic stop, participants perceived dog sniffs as
more invasive than asking drug-related questions. Also consis-
tent with the Court’s reasoning that the timing of the extended
investigation relative to issuing a ticket is the most important
factor, participants perceived the extension of the stop as more
problematic when it was conducted after the ticket was issued
as opposed to before. Contrary to the Court’s argument that the
length of the extension of the stop is not important, partici-
pants thought that the stop was more problematic when the
delay was long (17 minutes) or moderate (7 minutes) rather
than minimal (2 minutes).
CONCLUSION
Generally, law-enforcement-trained-dog sniffs are not
searches requiring probable cause to conduct, unless con-
ducted within the curtilage of a home or someplace where the
dog and its handler are not entitled to be. As such, the police
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allows student searches in public schools
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) – 
running from police provides basis for stop
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) – 
thermal imaging evidence not sufficient for probable cause
warrant 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) – 
police can search vehicle after arrest only if have 
reasonable belief to find evidence or other probable cause
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are usually not required to obtain a warrant or establish prob-
able cause before the dog sniff. But as the legal landscape
evolves, and new technology and privacy implications arise,
courts will continue to face novel fact patterns regarding dog
sniffs. Courts will have to address the issue of at what point a
sniffer dog crosses the line to an invasive technology similar to
the device used in Kyllo. The training and reliability of the
dogs, the ability to detect potentially lawful items, and the pri-
vacy of the area sniffed, are all concerns courts must consider
when evaluating these searches. 
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There may be no state interest more compelling than theindependence, impartiality, and integrity of the judi-ciary.1 There may also be no public office for which indi-
vidual accountability is so critical, not only because judges
often have the last word in our society’s disputes, but because
public confidence in the courts is fundamental to the rule of
law around which our society is organized. Trust in the
administration of justice depends not only on the merits of
the verdicts rendered in the courtroom but on the probity and
the appearance of probity among those who decree them. A
litigant may not feel happy about losing a case, but no one
should walk out of a proceeding reasonably believing that the
process was tainted by an arbiter who was biased, improperly
influenced, or otherwise unfair. 
By the early twentieth century, some states had individually
attempted to address the delicate balance between judicial
independence and accountability, typically by drafting rudi-
mentary standards of ethical conduct to which judges could
aspire.2 The American Bar Association then took up the issue
and in 1924 issued Canons of Judicial Ethics, which attempted
to harmonize the judicial responsibility to decide cases free
from outside influence with the judge’s obligation to behave on
and off the bench in a manner that enhances respect for the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.3
Throughout the United States, while the 1924 ABA code
offered commendable aspirational guidance to the bench,
enforcement was either entirely lacking or left to the courts
themselves. Not surprisingly, judges were not especially ener-
getic about enforcing rules of conduct on one another.4 Nor
was the alternative remedy of impeachment apt to be initiated
by a legislature.5
It was not until 1960 that a state adopted a method of judi-
cial ethics enforcement that was not controlled by the judi-
ciary itself.6 The California Commission on Judicial Perfor-
mance was created to investigate and, where appropriate,
impose public discipline on judges who were found to have
violated promulgated rules of judicial ethics.7 As other states
followed suit and there was talk of implementing ethics over-
sight in the federal courts, associations representing judges
and some newspapers expressed concerns that judicial con-
duct commissions would chill judicial independence.8 Far less
frequently appreciated was the degree to which a judicial con-
duct commission could protect and promote the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. Now, nearly 60 years after the advent of
the first one, independent ethics entities have not only
become part of the judicial landscape in the states, they have
indeed safeguarded judicial independence as surely as they
have redressed judicial misconduct. 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
Although the judiciary article of the United States Constitu-
tion9 is far shorter than the legislative and executive articles
that together established our tripartite system of government,
its role and impact are outsized. From the founding of the
American republic, an independent and impartial judiciary has
not only been the indispensable anchor of our tripartite system
of government, it has been an immeasurable protector of our
most basic rights and liberties, such as ensuring the right to
counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to a fair
trial, the right to free expression, and the right to worship. This
may subject judges to unfair and certainly unwanted criticism.
A prosecutor may denounce the release of a defendant on rec-
ognizance. A public defender may decry the imposition of the
maximum sentence against a convicted felon. An editorial may
take issue with an appellate court’s legal reasoning. A public
official may claim bias because of a judge’s political pedigree or
ethnic ancestry.
Whatever pressure or public clamor may be brought to bear,
the judge’s job is to act at all times, on and off the bench, in a
manner that upholds and promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 
Why are judicial probity and fairness so significant?
Because public confidence in the administration of justice is
what keeps people coming back to the courts and what
empowers the writ of our law. The judicial branch may be the
most subtle and least understood of the three, but its indepen-
dence, integrity, and impartiality are at the heart of what
George Washington identified as the “due administration of
justice” that is the “firmest pillar of good government.”10 And
as Alexander Hamilton explicated in The Federalist in 1787-
62 Court Review - Volume 55  
Toward a Judiciary Both 
Independent and Accountable
Robert H. Tembeckjian
11. The Federalist, numbers 78 through 83.
12. The Kathryn Steinle Murder Trial: Why the Jury and Trump Saw Two
Different Cases, L. A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2017, available at
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-kate-steinle-analysis-
20171202-story.html.
13. John Roberts, 2011 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, at 1-
2, available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/2011year-endreport.pdf.
14. Judicial ethics enforcement entities are variously called commis-
sions, boards, offices, etc. For purposes of this article, they are
generically referred to as “commissions.”
15. ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Feb. 2007, available at
https://bit.ly/2HLvNlf.
16. National Center for State Courts, Center for Judicial Ethics.
17. ABA, Model Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement, available
at https://bit.ly/2EHIxr9.
88,11 and history has repeatedly underscored, the judiciary
owes its power not to an army to enforce its will, nor to the
public purse to fund its mandates, but to the integrity of its
judgments. It is confidence in that integrity, and in the princi-
ple that the litigant will get a fair shake from an impartial mag-
istrate, a fair-minded jury, and an unbiased appellate reviewer,
that keeps citizens coming to the courts rather than turning to
the streets to resolve disputes.
Time and again, from the earliest days of our civil society to
the present, the courts have stood up to the potential tyranny of
the mob and government. Not always, of course. Judges and
juries are fallible human beings. Try as they might to get it right,
sometimes they get it wrong. As every trial judge knows and
occasionally jokes, that is why we have appellate courts.
But at critical junctures in our history, ordinary citizens,
protected by evenhanded judges, have made extraordinary
decisions that shaped what we became as a society of laws. In
New York in 1734, when a Grand Jury refused to indict John
Peter Zenger for libel but the Attorney General charged him
anyway, a petit jury acquitted him, and two classic American
principles were enshrined before we even had a national con-
stitution: freedom of the press and truth as a defense. Nearly
three centuries later in California in November 2017, when a
jury found Jose Ines Garcia Zarate guilty of felonious posses-
sion of a firearm but not guilty of the heartbreaking murder of
Kate Steinle, another anonymous group of average citizens
demonstrated what the rule of law looks like. Despite the mas-
sive attention drawn to the case because the defendant was a
repeat illegal entrant into the United States, a jury of average
citizens upheld the proposition that a defendant may only be
convicted if the proof is properly presented and beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, and that even the xenophobic public pro-
nouncements of politicians must not lead jurors to where the
evidence does not go.12
JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Before there was a code of judicial conduct, it was not nec-
essarily uncommon for judges to engage in activities that com-
promised or appeared to compromise their judicial indepen-
dence. Indeed, the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics was
adopted in significant measure because Kennesaw Mountain
Landis, the first commissioner of major league baseball who
was also a federal judge, refused to quit the bench and insisted
on performing both jobs contemporaneously.13 Although Lan-
dis eventually relinquished his judgeship, without meaningful
enforcement mechanisms in either the federal or state court
systems, the 1924 Canons were largely hortatory, and compli-
ance was voluntary.
Beginning with California in 1960, all 50 states moved to
fill the vacuum between judi-
cial independence and account-
ability with judicial ethics
enforcement commissions.14
Moreover, every state has
adapted the ABA Model Code,
most recently revised in 2007,
whose preamble describes it as
“rules of reason” intended as
both a guide to ethical behavior
and a basis for imposing sanc-
tions.15 At the federal level, and even in states that have
adopted codes and means of enforcement for executive and
legislative branch officials, judges are bound to a more strin-
gent set of promulgated standards of conduct than any other
public officers. And few are as energetically enforced. In 
2018, for example, 136 judges were publicly disciplined in 34
states, including 29 in Texas, 19 in New York and eight each
in California and Washington.16
While the concept of an independent judiciary came well
before public insistence on an accountable one, it would be
wrong to conclude that the latter is a brake on the former.
Contrary to what may be a common complaint among judges,
judicial conduct commissions, far from inhibiting judicial
independence, actually and critically protect it. Recognizing
that judicial commissions are here to stay, in 1994 the ABA also
adopted Model Rules of Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement,
inter alia to help ethics professionals avoid crossing the line
between independence and accountability.17
A judicial conduct commission is not an appellate court. It
can neither remand nor remit a case, nor overrule a court-adju-
dicated finding of fact or conclusion of law. Nor in most states
does the commission have administrative authority over the
courts, so it cannot transfer cases from one judge to another,
nor reassign a judge to a different term of court or part of the
state. Typically, it can only investigate and, where appropriate,
discipline a judge for violating the Code. Even where the com-
mission determines that a judge was unethically motivated to
decide a case a certain way and should be removed from
office—say, a close relative of the judge was a party or lawyer
in the matter, or the judge had a substantial undisclosed inter-
est that was affected by the outcome—the determination may
only discipline the judge; it has no effect on the court case
itself. An aggrieved party would have to seek redress through
the courts themselves to mitigate or undo the disciplined
judge’s mal-motivated decision.
Whether by confidential caution, public reprimand or
removal from office, the commission holds the judiciary to
account for ethical transgressions and plays an important role
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in protecting the public from
unfit incumbents.18 Many also
have authority to retire a judge
for physical or mental disability.19
Of course, however justified,
even the mildest discipline will
sting the affected judge. It may,
therefore, be natural for judges to
view judicial commissions with suspicion, as a scold or even as
an inhibitor rather than protector of judicial independence.
But they would be wrong.
Examining the record of the New York State Commission
on Judicial Conduct, statistically the most active in the coun-
try since its creation in 1978, makes the point.
There are over 1,400 courts throughout New York, and
approximately 3,300 judges. Since 1978, the commission has
issued over 850 public disciplinary decisions including 172
removals from office.20 But these startling numbers do not tell
the entire story. For in addition to the disciplines it imposes,
the commission absorbs a great deal of public and personalized
criticism that would ordinarily be directed to the judiciary.
Those 850 disciplines comprise a mere 1.5% of the more than
58,000 complaints received, processed, analyzed, and mostly
rejected over that same time frame. In other words, 98.5% of
the time, the commission tells a complainant that there was no
ethical wrongdoing, and it explains why.21 Nearly half of those
complaints were limited to expressions of dissatisfaction with
the court’s decision, and not one of those was investigated.22
In receiving, considering, dismissing, and explaining its rea-
sons for declining to investigate such complaints, the commis-
sion deflects and takes upon itself the anger of litigants that
would otherwise be aimed at the courts. Moreover, in a public
annual report, it not only elucidates the behavior that did result
in discipline but also demonstrates with statistical evidence
that it shields judges from unfair attack.23 As such, the com-
mission helps to protect the judge’s freedom and responsibility
to rule on the merits.
The New York experience is representative. In virtually all
jurisdictions, the statistical record is the same. The vast major-
ity of complaints are dismissed as without merit.24
The recent firestorm of controversy in California regarding
the so-called “Stanford rape case” is a prime example of how a
disciplinary commission may actually protect the indepen-
dence of the judiciary. It is also a lesson in the perils of allow-
ing a superseding process to negate that protection.
Whatever one’s view of the merits of Judge Aaron Persky’s
sentencing of former Stanford University swimmer Brock
Turner for the sexual assault of an unconscious “Emily Doe”—
three months in jail, plus three years’ probation and registra-
tion as a sex offender—it was the California Commission on
Judicial Performance that initially answered the public outcry
from those who considered the sentence lenient. The Califor-
nia commission examined and found that the sentence was
lawful and within the judge’s discretion, that he had not been
motivated by such misconduct as bias based on gender, race,
or socioeconomic status, and that he was not insensitive to the
seriousness of sexual assault.25 That should have been the last
word, but it was not. The California commission was subjected
to fierce political criticism for exonerating Judge Persky of mis-
conduct,26 and the state auditor initiated an investigation of
the commission itself.27
As for Judge Persky, being cleared of misconduct by the
commission did not save him from California’s recall provi-
sion, through which he was ousted from office by majority
vote.28 In a spectacular irony, a judge who was ethically bound
“not [to] be swayed by public clamor or fear of criticism”29 was
removed from the bench as a result of both. Mindful of the
warnings over 225 years ago, not only by Alexander Hamilton
about tampering with judicial independence but also by James
Madison about the “impulse of passion” that may perniciously
factionalize the body politic,30 one might ask: What is more
likely to chill the independent rendering of judicial decisions:
the removal of a judge for ethical misconduct by a disciplinary
commission after a due-process proceeding, or the recall of a
judge by an electorate unhappy with a single decision?
The California commission’s experience in Persky is not
singular.
In 1997, in Matter of Duckman, a case that generated world-
wide attention, the New York commission threaded the needle
between acts of misconduct and judicial discretion.31 Duck-
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man, a New York City Criminal Court Judge, had reduced the
bail on a defendant from $5,000 (which he couldn’t make) to
$2,000 (which he could). The defendant promptly went out
and killed both his girlfriend and himself. The political and
tabloid outcry against Judge Duckman was unprecedented.
The then-governor, mayor and state Senate majority leader,
among many others, called for his removal.32 The tabloid
focus on Duckman brought to light numerous other problem-
atic acts in his judicial record, and the commission deter-
mined to remove him from office for inter alia repeatedly mak-
ing statements that were gender and race insensitive, and for
deliberately dismissing accusatory instruments as facially
insufficient when he knew they were not, because he did not
believe the lower-level crimes at issue should be prosecuted.
But as to the matter for which the governor and others wanted
him removed—the bail reduction that led to murder—the
commission dismissed the charge, having determined that it
was a lawful ruling within the judge’s discretion, and that it
had not been tainted by prejudice or other misconduct.
Promptly thereafter, the evidently displeased governor recom-
mended a cut in the commission’s budget, which was later
restored by the legislature.
JUDICIAL DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS
As effective as the states have been in enforcing judicial
ethics, the federal judiciary has lagged far behind. To be sure,
there is a Code of Conduct for United States Judges, based on
the same ABA Model Code the states have all adapted and
adopted.33 But there is no office or dedicated professional
staff to enforce it. The federal judiciary has retained the
exclusive authority to police itself—the failure of which in
the states led to the evolution of independent ethics-enforc-
ing commissions.
It is exceedingly rare for a federal judge to be disciplined. In
2016, for example, 1,303 complaints were filed with the fed-
eral circuits, but only four were investigated.34 In the past
decade fewer than one federal judge per year has been disci-
plined.35 In the history of the United States, only 15 federal
judges have been impeached; eight were convicted, three
resigned, four were acquitted. Two who had been convicted of
crimes—Harry Claiborne of Nevada and Walter Nixon of Mis-
sissippi—refused to quit, went to jail and drew their judicial
salaries until Congress impeached
and removed them from office.36
These shortcomings were most
recently illustrated by the failure
of the federal judicial disciplinary
“system” to complete ethics
inquiries into important com-
plaints because the judges at issue
suddenly resigned—e.g., former
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex
Kozinski, who was accused of sexual harassment,37 or Third
Circuit Associate Judge Maryanne Trump Barry, who was
accused of financial fraud38—or failed even to undertake an
investigation because the judge, Brett Kavanaugh, was elevated
to the Supreme Court, which does not apply the Code of Judi-
cial Conduct to itself.39
Such high-profile failures and generally low investigative
numbers inevitably suggest that the federal bench, which is
probably no more or less ethically challenged than the typical
state bench, is self-protective. Indeed, a committee chaired by
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer commented in a 2006
report that a system in which judges judge one another is at
risk of undue favoritism.40
Public confidence in the federal courts could be improved
by the creation of an independent judicial monitor to collect
complaints, investigate those with merit, and initiate proceed-
ings before a disciplinary panel of judges designated by the
chief justice for lesser, i.e. non-removable offenses. In egre-
gious cases, the independent monitor could recommend pro-
ceedings to the House of Representatives, since the only means
by which a federal judge may be removed is impeachment by
the House and conviction by the Senate.41
The languid federal ethics enforcement record has been
addressed more than once by the Supreme Court, the United
States Judicial Conference, and the United States Senate, but
meaningful, comprehensive reform has remained elusive. The
Breyer committee in 2006 recommended a uniform procedure
throughout all the federal circuits for dealing with complaints
against judges, but it did not recommend a centralized staff or
process. There is no staff specifically trained and dedicated to
adjudicating let alone rooting out misconduct among judges
systemwide. There is no equivalent to the ABA Model Rules of
Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement.
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The Executive Committee of
the United States Judicial Confer-
ence, chaired by Judge Merrick
Garland of the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, recently reexamined
the federal court ethics enforce-
ment system, but in its March
2019 report it, too, chose to keep
judges firmly in charge of their
own discipline.42 This will not
likely inspire public confidence
or result in more sanctions than what has become the minimal
norm. While the federal courts did take a step forward by cre-
ating a Judicial Integrity Office in December 2018 that became
operative in April 2019, its mandate is limited to “workplace
conduct matters” for court employees.43 The broad range of
ethical matters addressed in the judicial code of conduct,
applicable to judges, are apparently not within the purview of
the new judicial integrity officer.44
More than once since 2006, Congress has entertained pro-
posals to strengthen the system by creating an “Inspector
General for the Judicial Branch,” to be appointed by the chief
justice on consultation with congressional leaders.45 Among
other things, the inspector general would investigate possible
misconduct by judges, as well as conduct audits and pursue
inquiries as to non-judicial employees to prevent and detect
waste, fraud, and abuse. It would report to the Chief Justice
and to the Congress on matters that may require action by
either, which could result in the reprimand of a judge by the
courts or the impeachment and removal of a judge by the
House and Senate.46 While such legislation has never
advanced beyond committee, the less effectually the courts
appear to deal with the next string of notorious Kozinski-
Kavanaugh-Barry type issues, the more likely Congress will be
to act, for better or worse. Having a system legislatively
imposed on the courts could be avoided by crafting a mean-
ingful one on their own.
Would it be too much to expect, in a cynical and dizzying
political era, for our federal judiciary to demonstrate how to
accept responsibility and promote accountability in contrast to
political actors that often try to avoid both? Might an invigo-
rated national system of judicial ethics enforcement show, as
state government entities have long demonstrated, that officers
of at least one branch of government are held to the highest
standards of conduct, with measurable and measured conse-
quences when, on occasion, they fail to meet those standards?
Doing so would considerably enhance public confidence in
what always must remain the “firmest pillar” of our constitu-
tional republic.
BUILDING AND MAINTAINING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN
THE COURTS
Judges and ethics enforcers have important roles to play in
protecting the independence of the courts and the public’s
confidence in it. At times that may mean acting contrary to
popular opinion. It may mean restraint when action would be
so much easier and more politically expedient. It may require
engaging in some public education, as the California commis-
sion did in the Persky matter, and the New York commission
did in Duckman. Yet the greatest risk to judicial independence
is one that a judicial ethics enforcement entity has no power
to combat.
In an age when normative public standards and constitu-
tional institutions routinely come under attack, in some
instances by the very people who are sworn to preserve, pro-
tect and defend them, the judiciary must not become just
another casualty of partisan politics or culture wars. Yet a
judicial ethics commission has no authority over a president
who seems blithely to criticize judicial decisions as “a dis-
grace” simply because he disagrees with them,47 nor over a
Congress that seems to spiral ever downward toward an acri-
monious partisan abyss.
Perhaps nowhere is the threat to an independent judiciary
more evident than the rancorous manner in which we elect or
appoint judicial officers. As the US Supreme Court case of
Caperton v. Massey Coal and the blood sport of federal judi-
cial nominations all too vividly reveal, special interest groups
now commit unseemly amounts of money to affect judicial
elections and nominations. In Caperton, millions of coal
industry dollars were spent to elect a West Virginia Supreme
Court Justice who then cast the tie-breaking vote in a case
favoring the coal industry. The US Supreme Court found the
compromise to independence and impartiality so great as to
invalidate the decision.48
Yet seven years before Caperton, in Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White, the Supreme Court had released judicial candi-
dates from rules that prohibited unfettered comment on polit-
ical issues in the course of their campaigns.49 Short of making
a pledge, promise, or commitment with respect to cases, con-
troversies, or issues likely to come before the court, judicial
candidates were freed to say just about anything that circum-
spect judges had previously avoided.
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A related Code provision, the “disqualification rule,”
requires a judge to recuse in any case where his or her impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned, including where the
judge, while a candidate, made a public statement that com-
mits, or appears to commit, the judge with respect to an issue
in the proceeding, the controversy itself and, in some jurisdic-
tions, the parties or a class of parties.50 In his concurring opin-
ion in White, Justice Anthony Kennedy noted that the states
may adopt disqualification standards more rigorous than due
process requires and may discipline judges who violate those
standards.51 Yet despite reasonable and constitutionally valid
restrictions on judicial campaign conduct, Caperton demon-
strates the extreme partisanship into which formerly staid judi-
cial campaigns may descend.
Do we really want a judiciary that is elected in the same way
as legislators and executives, picking up special-interest
endorsements, hustling for votes? What would be the judicial
equivalent of a pledge to “bring home the bacon”—a figurative
wink to landlords while addressing a real-estate group, or to
renters while addressing a tenants’ association? Do we want to
create the impression, and even worse, the reality, of judges
beholden to voting blocs? Will we so taint the judiciary by the
manner in which we elect them that they cannot be or appear
impartial once they get to the bench?
Ultimately, the burden to sort through these conundrums
falls on judicial ethics enforcers. For example, under White a
judicial candidate may permissively say, “I have always
believed life begins at conception,” but not say, “If an abortion
case comes before me, I will rule in favor of the unborn child.”
The latter would likely result in discipline under the “pledges
or promises” clause. It would also likely trigger disqualifica-
tion from an abortion-rights case because the candidate would
have made a statement that did or appeared to commit to a
party or a particular result. Substitute “pro-choice” for “right-
to-life” in this example, and the ultimate result would be the
same. (How ironic that publicly declaring one’s allegiance on
an issue, to gain the vote of its adherents, would end up dis-
qualifying the candidate, once elected, from hearing cases on
that very issue.)
Other campaign statements may not violate the rules so
clearly. If a candidate were to say, “I have long been pro-choice
[or right-to-life], and on the bench, I will always try to do the
right thing,” a disciplinary enforcer would have to weigh
whether this was a disguised and prohibited issue-related
“pledge” or “promise,” and whether imposing discipline for it
would promote or erode judicial independence. This would
not be an easy call, and the result might well trigger a First
Amendment appeal akin to White, with unpredictable and
unintended consequences.
Electoral campaigns are not the only place in which judicial
aspirants are subjected to partisan pounding. In United States
Senate confirmations, passionate liberal or conservative
activists mobilize their bases: pro-choice and right-to-life
groups, pro-business and pro-consumer associations, pro-gun
and gun-control lobbyists, law-and-order advocates and civil
libertarians, and countless others. Rarely in these debates,
except from well-schooled nominees who deflect specific
issue-related questions, do we hear any passion for the idea
that a judge should rule with integrity on the facts and law
without injecting personal beliefs into the equation. Yet that is
the ultimate ideal. A judge who believes in either pro-choice or
right-to-life should still be able to decide whether there was
trespass at an abortion clinic, on the facts, without ideology. 
The increasingly divisive, special-interest, and politically
driven view of the judiciary cannot be what we want for our
system of justice. But, like the electoral recall of Judge Persky
in California, it poses a far greater threat to judicial indepen-
dence and the rule of law than any judicial disciplinary com-
mission ever did. This trend toward factionalizing the judi-
ciary, which brings with it the potential to eviscerate the most
distinguishing, liberty-saving feature of our constitutional gov-
ernance, must be resisted. It cannot be said forcefully enough
that there is a compelling, even overriding state interest in the
independence, impartiality, and integrity of the judiciary. We
play with it, and fail to protect it, at our great national peril.
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In 2018, as a result of state disciplinary proceedings, sevenjudges were removed from office, 25 judges resigned orretired in lieu of discipline and publicly agreed to never
serve again, one judge agreed to resign and was publicly
admonished, 11 judges were suspended without pay, three
judges received cease-and-desist orders, and 84 judges
received public censures, reprimands, admonishments, or
warnings.1 Reflecting that the code of judicial conduct requires
a judge “to act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary,”2 the conduct underlying those sanctions related
both to performing judicial duties, such as abuse of authority
and lack of diligence, and to off-bench activities, such as dri-
ving while intoxicated and inappropriate political activity.2
SOCIAL MEDIA
The trend of judges getting into trouble on Facebook that
began in 2009 continued through 2018, with several discipline
cases illustrating the perils of participating on social-media
platforms that judicial ethics advisory committees have
warned judges about.
For example, the Arizona Commission on Judicial Conduct
publicly reprimanded a judge for mocking a litigant in a Face-
book post that purported to be a verbatim account of an evic-
tion proceeding over which the judge had presided and began:
“In the category of, You can’t make this stuff up!”3 The post
described a maintenance man’s testimony about finding heroin
under the bathroom rug in the tenant’s apartment. The tenant
testified that the heroin was not his, explaining that cocaine
was his drug of choice and he keeps his drugs in a safe. When
asked how the heroin got into his apartment, the tenant
replied: “I don’t know. Maybe one of the hookers I had in my
apartment left it.” The judge’s post ended: “Needless to say, the
Court ruled in favor of the landlord.”
When one of his Facebook friends asked if this was a true
story, the judge posted: “Yes. It goes without staying but the
tenant wasn’t the brightest bulb in the chandelier.” 
Based on an agreement, the Kentucky Judicial Conduct
Commission publicly reprimanded a judge for sharing a news
story on her Facebook account with the comment: “This
murder suspect was RELEASED FROM JAIL just hours after
killing a man and confessing to police.”4 The judge’s Facebook
account included her title and name.
Even if a post does not use the judge’s title, it may consti-
tute judicial misconduct. The New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct noted that although a judge’s disparaging
posts about a private-property dispute did not refer to the
judge’s judicial position or mention the litigant by name,
“many in his small community would likely know that he is a
judge and would recognize the property and individuals
involved.”5 The litigant, S., had bought property from the
estate of the stepfather of the judge’s wife. S. was also the com-
plaining witness in several cases against her domestic partner
before the judge and his co-judge.
After someone filed a complaint about the judges’ handling
of the cases, the judge posted photographs on his Facebook
account, six showing the property before its sale to S. and four
showing disarray when S. was in default on the purchase con-
tract. The judge commented: “good [sic] thing mommy and
daddy come [sic] through. (if selling do a back groung [sic]
check.)” The judge intended the post to be publicly viewable
because he was “upset” at S. for repeatedly and publicly accus-
ing him and his co-judge of misconduct and encouraging
others to file complaints with the Commission.
The Commission found that the photos and derogatory
comments constituted misconduct.
Even if he was provoked by what he perceived as S.’s
improper behavior, it was respondent’s obligation as a
judge to observe high standards of conduct and to act
with restraint and dignity instead of escalating the
unseemly public accusations and debate over a private
matter that played out on Facebook. Every judge must
understand that a judge’s right to speak publicly is lim-
ited because of the important responsibilities a judge has
in dispensing justice, maintaining impartiality and
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acting at all times in a manner that promotes public con-
fidence in the judge’s integrity.
RESPONSIBILITY
Several judges were held responsible in 2018 for content
posted by others to whom they had delegated the responsibil-
ity of maintaining their Facebook pages. For example, the
Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly repri-
manded a judge for, in addition to other misconduct, campaign
advertisements for other candidates posted on his Facebook
page even though he had not authorized the posts and did not
know about them until he received the Commission’s inquiry.6
Similarly, the Texas Commission publicly admonished a judge
for Facebook posts advertising a school-supply drive, soliciting
donations for an individual, and advertising his donation of a
rifle to a charitable raffle. Even though a member of his judi-
cial staff handled his Facebook page, many posts were made
without his prior authorization, and he was often unaware of
what appeared on his page.7
That responsibility extends to judicial candidates and their
campaign Facebook pages. For example, the Florida Supreme
Court removed a judge from office for criticism of her cam-
paign opponent for representing criminal defendants on a
Facebook page that was created by an electioneering-commu-
nications organization formed by her campaign consultant.8
The Court held that the judge’s actions, “individually and
through her campaign, for which she was ultimately responsi-
ble[,] unquestionably eroded public confidence in the judi-
ciary.” The Court emphasized that nothing in the code of judi-
cial conduct permitted a judicial candidate to delegate to a
“campaign manager the responsibility for written materials
created or distributed by the campaign.”
The Nevada Commission on Judicial Discipline publicly
reprimanded a former judge for a photoshopped picture of her-
self and an actor that her campaign manager had posted on her
campaign Facebook page, which misled the public that the
Rock had endorsed her campaign, and for her subsequent
comment on the post: “I’m ‘almost’ taller than him. Almost.”9
The Commission found that the judge had failed to take rea-
sonable measures to ensure that her campaign representatives
complied with the code of judicial conduct, noting that her
contract with her campaign manager did not contain any
restrictions on the posting of social-media materials, such as
obtaining prior approval from the judge, that the judge did not
discuss with campaign representatives the prohibitions in the
code, and that the judge failed to supervise her campaign rep-
resentatives. The Commission reminded judicial candidates
that “campaign-related social media platforms, such as Face-
book, maintained by a campaign committee or others, do not
insulate them from the strictures of the Code.” 
RE-POSTING
The importance of judges’
understanding the technical
aspects of the social media they
use was highlighted by a case in
which a court commissioner told
his presiding judge and the Cali-
fornia Commission on Judicial
Performance that he had taken
posts down when that was not
true, although the gravamen of
the misconduct was the “egre-
gious” posts and re-posts on his Facebook page.10 In May of
2017, the presiding judge wrote the commissioner that there
was a “significant concern” about the “content” of a number of
his posts and the “impression” a member of the public might
have on viewing them. In a written response, the commissioner
stated that he had deleted the posts, had refrained from sharing
similar posts, and had “designated my Facebook account as
‘private’ which means only my friends can view any future
posts.” In his self-report to the Commission, the commissioner
repeated those representations.
However, for at least four months longer, the commis-
sioner’s Facebook page remained public, and several of the
posts were still on the page. Although the commissioner had
tried to change the page to private, his “unfamiliarity with the
technology resulted in the changes not taking effect as
intended.” When he was told that the posts were still public,
“the commissioner immediately sought further assistance,
deleted the offending posts, and increased the privacy settings
on his Facebook profile.”
Reproducing screenshots of many of the posts, the Com-
mission decision described at least 45 posts or re-posts that
“inherently” undermined public confidence in the judiciary
and brought the judicial office into disrepute. The commis-
sioner’s page reflected, among other things, anti-immigration
sentiment, anti-Muslim sentiment, anti-Native American senti-
ment, anti-gay-marriage and anti-transgender sentiment, anti-
liberal and anti-Democrat sentiment, anti-California senti-
ment, opposition to then-presidential candidate Hillary Clin-
ton, accusations against President Barack Obama, a lack of
respect for the federal justice system, and contempt for the
poor. Based on a stipulation, the Commission publicly cen-
sured the now-former commissioner and barred him from
receiving an appointment of work from any California state
court, noting that, because the commissioner had retired, that
was the strongest discipline it could impose.
As that case illustrates, judges may be liable not only for their
original content on Facebook but also for material they re-post.
Similarly, the Texas Commission publicly reprimanded a judge
for sharing a “meme” on his Facebook page that featured a pic-
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pline, October 22, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
y865qdxy.
10. In the Matter Concerning Gianquinto, Decision and order (Cali-
fornia Commission on Judicial Performance, August 22, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/ydguvlza. 
[A]t least 45
[social media]
posts or re-posts
. . . “inherently”
undermined
public confidence
in the 
judiciary. . . .
Court Review - Volume 55 69
11. Public Reprimand of Burkeen (Texas State Commission on Judicial
Conduct, February 21, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
y9nnywla. 
12. In re Yu, Stipulation, Agreement, and order (Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 7, 2018), available at
https://tinyurl.com/yava9qfm; In re Svaren, stipulation, agreement,
and order (Washington State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
December 7, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/ yd8drd98.
13. Law Offices of Herssein and Herssein v. United Services Automo-
bile Association (Florida Supreme Court, November 15, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/ybmvpec8. 
ture of retired Marine Corps General
James Mattis with the text, “Fired by
Obama to please the Muslims, hired by
Trump to exterminate them.”11 The
judge told the Commission that he
thought the meme “showed an inter-
esting contrast” between the two pres-
idents’ attitudes toward General Mattis
but that he later realized that he
“should not have posted it, because it’s
not just about how [he] interpreted it,
but how others might.” The reprimand
was also for his own posts “railing or
venting” about the intolerance of liberals. 
MORE GUIDANCE
Illustrating the need for further guidance on charitable activ-
ities and social media, the Washington State Commission on
Judicial Conduct admonished two judicial officers for Face-
book posts soliciting contributions to nonprofit organiza-
tions.12 In both decisions, the Commission noted that “social
media is a relatively new form of communication,” and “the law
tends to lag behind technology.” Stating that most judges “are
quite conscious that they may not solicit funds for themselves
or others in face-to-face encounters,” the Commission con-
cluded that there is no “meaningful or workable distinction
between in-person and written or electronic solicitations.” The
Commission emphasized that the “prohibition against judicial
solicitation of money does not reflect on the worthiness or
virtue of the charity or cause” but that “a near blanket prohibi-
tion . . . is necessary as it would be impossible to exercise prin-
cipled distinctions based on the nature of the charity involved,
and it would be improper to have a government agency such as
a conduct commission make such value choices.” 
Thus, the Commission publicly admonished a supreme court
justice for two posts soliciting support for nonprofit organiza-
tions. The justice’s Facebook page identifies her as a member of
the judiciary and, “[i]n Facebook parlance,” is a “government
official” page that anyone can access and that no one can
“friend.” The justice is actively engaged in the community and
uses the page to educate viewers about matters related to the
judicial branch; her posts are intended to make the court and
judicial officers more accessible and transparent to the public.
On April 22, 2018, the justice posted on her Facebook page:
Join Lifelong for Dining Out For Life on April 26!
On Thursday, April 26, raise your fork for Dining Out
For Life! Join Lifelong at one of 90 restaurants in the
Greater Seattle Area who are set to donate 30-50% of
their proceeds to vital programs that support people
facing serious illness and poverty in our community.
(Lifelong is a nonprofit organization that provides recovery
assistance for persons suffering from drug abuse and addic-
tion.) Similarly, the justice posted on her Facebook page about
a weekly newspaper that employs homeless people and previ-
ously homeless people as vendors.
The Commission explained:
While these Facebook posts present no articulable ele-
ment of coercion, the Commission finds that it is still
an abuse of the prestige of judicial office. The prestige
is appropriately reserved for the service of the office
itself, and not to be used for the individual benefit of
the judge or others, regardless how generally good the
cause may be.
The justice did not believe her posts rose to the level of a
solicitation, but she acknowledged that the Commission is the
body charged with enforcing the code and deferred to its deter-
mination that the posts were a violation. Recognizing that
greater guidance is needed on the increasingly prevalent use of
social media, the justice believed the stipulation would provide
such guidance and raise awareness of the risks of sharing infor-
mation on social media that could be construed as solicitations
or endorsements. 
DISQUALIFICATION
Outside the context of a judicial discipline case, in an inter-
locutory appeal from the denial of a motion to disqualify in a
civil case, the Florida Supreme Court held that, standing alone,
a judge’s Facebook “friendship” with an attorney appearing in
a case did not disqualify the judge from presiding over a case
involving the attorney, the first decision on the issue by any
state supreme court.13 The Court did not discuss whether a
judge should disclose a Facebook friendship with an attorney.
The Court began with the “general principal” that a tradi-
tional friendship between a judge and an attorney, standing
alone, did not require disqualification, noting that traditional
friendship “varies in degree from greatest intimacy to casual
acquaintance.” Facebook friendship, the Court found, “exists
on an even broader spectrum,” varying “in degree from great-
est intimacy to ‘virtual stranger’ or ‘complete stranger.’”
Therefore, the Court held, disqualification was not required:
no reasonably prudent person would fear that she could not
receive a fair and impartial trial based solely on a judge’s Face-
book friendship with an attorney that “in and of itself” pro-
vided “no significant information about the nature” of their
relationship, indicated only “a relationship of an indeterminate
nature” without revealing “the degree or intensity of the rela-
tionship,” and did not “signal the existence of a traditional
‘friendship’” much less “a close or intimate relationship.”
The Court disagreed with the reasoning of Florida Advisory
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Opinion 2009-20,14 which stated that a judge may not be
friends on Facebook with lawyers who may appear before the
judge. The advisory opinion itself does not mention disqualifi-
cation or the appearance of partiality. That advisory opinion
had reasoned that, because a judge’s Facebook friends may see
who the judge’s other Facebook friends are, the judge’s selec-
tion of some attorneys as friends on Facebook and rejection of
others and communication of those choices conveys, or per-
mits others to convey, the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge. Citing advisory opinions from
other states and noting that the Florida committee’s advice was
the minority position, the Court explained that even “tradi-
tional ‘friendship’ involves a ‘selection and communication
process,’ albeit one less formalized than the Facebook
process,” as people “traditionally ‘select’ their friends by choos-
ing to associate with them to the exclusion of others” and “tra-
ditionally ‘communicate’ the existence of their friendships by
choosing to spend time with their friends in public, introduc-
ing their friends to others, or interacting with them in other
ways that have a public dimension.”
In a dissent, one justice argued that, contrary to the premise
of the majority, “equating friendships in the real world with
friendships in cyberspace is a false equivalency.” The dissent
explained that a Facebook “friendship” “may reveal far more
information regarding the intimacy and the closeness of the
relationship,” noting that a Facebook friend “gains access to all
of the personal information on the user’s profile page—includ-
ing photographs, status updates, likes, dislikes, work informa-
tion, school history, digital images, videos, content from other
websites, and a host of other information—even when the user
opts to make all of his or her information private to the gen-
eral public” Further, the dissent argued, the majority’s standard
would force a litigant to engage in “impractical and potentially
invasive” discovery to determine if there was something more
than a mere Facebook “friendship” that could justify filing a
motion for recusal. The dissent urged the Court to “at least
adopt parameters for judges to follow when engaging with
social media” and in determining whether to friend an attorney
or disqualify from a case.
One justice filed a concurring opinion to “strongly urge
judges not to participate in Facebook.” The concurring justice
agreed that “‘friendship’ on Facebook, without more, does not
create a legally sufficient basis for disqualification” but argued
that “judges must avoid situations that could suggest or imply
that a ruling is based upon anything else.” Recognizing that
Facebook may be the primary means some judges “stay in touch
with family members, actual friends, or people with whom they
have reconnected after many years,” the concurring justice sug-
gested “at the very least,” judges
should carefully “limit their ‘friend-
ships’ to cover only such individuals.”
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT
It was too early to tell in 2018
whether the #MeToo movement,
which began in late 2017, would
result in more judges being sanc-
tioned for sexual harassment or sim-
ilar improprieties. Even if there has
been a recent increase in complaints
about such conduct to judicial discipline commissions, those
matters might still be in the confidential investigation phase,
particularly if the allegations are extensive and disputed.
As in every year, in 2018, there were several judges who
were publicly sanctioned for sexual misconduct or who
resigned while under investigation for such conduct. For
example, a former Kansas judge was ordered to cease and
desist from offensive and demeaning verbal and/or physical
conduct toward female court reporters and other judges and to
continue his retirement;15 a Texas justice of the peace was pub-
licly reprimanded for hiring a woman with whom he had an
intimate relationship and making inappropriate comments to
her during office hours, in addition to other misconduct;16 and
another Texas justice of the peace was publicly reprimanded
for engaging in an intimate relationship with the city’s prose-
cutor.17 The judges’ resignations and agreements not to serve
in judicial office again ended investigations of an Indiana mag-
istrate’s inappropriate relationships with court employees and
attorneys during court hours and on court property18 and a
Texas probate judge’s alleged affair with an attorney represent-
ing a party in a high-value probate matter before the judge, as
described in a magazine article titled “Ardor in the Court.”19
Accepting the parties’ stipulation of facts, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court indefinitely suspended a judge without
pay and publicly censured him for his sexual relationship with
a member of the drug court team.20 The Court noted that there
had been no finding, determination, or stipulation about
whether there was sexual harassment or discrimination and
that it was not addressing that issue. The Court, which does
not have the authority to remove judges, provided that its
order be delivered to the governor and the legislature. The
judge resigned.
For approximately five months, while Tammy Cagle was an
active member of the team in the drug court over which the
judge presided, the judge and Cagle had sexual encounters in
Cagle’s home and in the judge’s office. The judge used his offi-
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21. In re Kathren, Stipulation, agreement, and order (Washington
State Commission on Judicial Conduct, December 7, 2018), avail-
able at https://tinyurl.com/y7xhvkb5. 
22. Model Code of Judicial Conduct (ABA 2007), Rule 2.8(B), avail-
able at https://tinyurl.com/y4juj9z6.
23. Public Admonition of Cross and Order of Additional Education
(Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, April 18, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/y823b7kg. 
24. In the Matter of O’Connor, 112 N.E.3d 317 (New York 2018). The
Court’s decision was based on the determination of the State Com-
mission on Judicial Conduct. In the Matter of the O’Connor,
Determination (New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,
March 30, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/y9e73pfq. 
cial e-mail account to communi-
cate with Cagle to facilitate one
of the encounters and to devise a
strategy to prevent his family
from seeing their text messages.
Before or after some of their
encounters, they discussed the
operation of the drug court gen-
erally and one defendant in par-
ticular. During their affair, the
judge attempted to mediate problems between Cagle and other
members of the drug court team.
Emphasizing that a judge is the leader of the drug court
team, the Court stated that it had “no doubt that the Judge’s
undisclosed sexual relationship with a member of his team
raises, at the least, the appearance of inappropriate influence
and partiality in his decisions regarding drug court participants
and thus puts the integrity of the drug court during his leader-
ship into question.” It explained:
Further damaging respect for his office, the Judge used
his [chambers] in the court house for at least several of
their sexual encounters, reflecting complete disrespect
for the dignity and decorum of the court. . . . It is beyond
dispute that these egregious, deliberate, and repeated
acts of misconduct severely diminished respect in the
eyes of the public not only for this judge but also for the
judiciary.
Although it noted that the judge’s “performance evaluations
suggest that he has been a conscientious judge who consis-
tently received very positive ratings from attorneys, court
employees, and jurors,” the Court concluded: “The Judge’s
misconduct . . . is serious, and his prior positive evaluations
cannot repair the damage to the judicial system caused by his
grave, willful, and repeated wrongdoing.”
INAPPROPRIATE “JOKE”
Based on a stipulation and agreement, the Washington State
Commission on Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge
for responding “nine inches” after a female court clerk stated
to him, “I have a question for you” after a court session.21
When the clerk expressed shock, the judge acknowledged that
his comment was inappropriate. 
Shortly thereafter, the clerk disclosed the incident to co-
workers. The following week, after being contacted by court
administration, the clerk reported the matter to the county
human resources department. The human resources manager
met with the judge, and the judge acknowledged the impro-
priety of his comment again, offered to formally apologize to
the clerk, and voluntarily agreed to view an online training
course on sexual harassment and discrimination. 
In his answer to the Commission’s statement of allegations,
the judge acknowledged that he made the comment and that it
was inappropriate. He explained that he had intended to make
a joke to a person he had known for several years and whom
he considered a friend but that he realized the comment was in
bad taste and “should not have been made regardless of [the
clerk’s] subjective opinion of its offensiveness.”
The Commission stated:
Comments of a sexual nature, such as the comment at
issue here, are inappropriate in any professional setting,
and particularly so when the speaker holds such a dis-
proportionately high position of power over the person
subjected to the comments. Because of that power dis-
parity, subordinate employees can feel inhibited from
reporting such conduct and endure a workplace unsure
of when they might again be subjected to it. Respon-
dent’s comment detracted from the dignity of Respon-
dent’s judicial office.
The Commission noted that the judge’s “inappropriate com-
ment appears to have resulted from Respondent being overly
casual around court staff and not showing due regard to his
role as a judge.”
DEMEANOR
As every year, many sanctions in 2018 were for violations of
the code requirement that a judge “be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers, court staff,
court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an offi-
cial capacity.”22 For example, the Texas State Commission on
Judicial Conduct publicly admonished a judge for (1) referring
to a man who was the subject of a guardianship proceedings as
“Mr. Maggot” or “Maggot Man” or words to that effect; (2) com-
paring the IQ of a woman who was the subject of a guardianship
proceeding to the IQ of a pen; and (3) interacting with litigants
in three guardianship cases in a manner that reasonably led
them to feel disrespected, demeaned, and frustrated.23
Injudicious demeanor was one of the grounds for which the
New York Court of Appeals removed two judges.
The Court removed one judge for (1) striking witness testi-
mony and dismissing petitions in two cases because counsel
reflexively kept saying “okay”; (2) on numerous occasions,
acting impatiently, raising his voice, and making demeaning
and insulting remarks to attorneys, often in open court; (3)
awarding counsel fees without providing an opportunity to be
heard, contrary to applicable rules; and (4) failing to cooperate
with the Commission.24
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For example, during direct examination in a non-jury trial,
when Pamela Smith, who represented the landlord/petitioner,
said “okay” after her witness’s answers, the judge told her to
“stop telling [the witness] his answers are okay”; Smith apolo-
gized. Shortly thereafter, Smith again said “okay” after some of
her witness’s answers, and the judge again told her to stop, and
Smith again apologized.
The next time Smith said “okay” after her witness’s answers,
the judge interrupted her for a third time and told her to “[s]top
telling [the witness] his answers are okay.” Smith apologized
again and explained that it was a “reflex.” The judge said it was
not a reflex because she did not do it all the time, warned that
he would strike the testimony and dismiss the case the next
time she did it, and asked, “Do we understand each other?”
When Smith said “okay” after the very next answer, she
caught herself and immediately apologized. Nevertheless, the
judge sua sponte excused the witness, telling Smith, “the testi-
mony is stricken because you clearly were leading him by
telling him periodically that his answers were okay. And that’s
totally unacceptable.”
Smith called another witness and said “okay” after the wit-
ness’s response to her first question. The judge told her, “That’s
once. Next time —.” When Smith said “okay” a short time
later, the judge struck the testimony of her second witness.
After Smith said she had no other witnesses, the judge granted
opposing counsel’s motion to dismiss for lack of evidence. The
dismissal meant Smith’s client had to restart the case, and he
lost approximately $90,000 as a result. 
In several other non-jury trials, the judge made comments
to attorneys such as:
• “[You and I] have probably a different idea of how a
professional conducts themselves.” 
• “[You have] no idea what you’re doing,” and “Appar-
ently, there’s a lot you don’t understand.”
• “You don’t have to sarcastically say thank you every
time I make a ruling, okay counsel? . . . I don’t see any
other way to take it, counsel . . . . It’s obviously clear.”
• “Maybe you should do something right for a change
instead of just apologizing all the time okay, counsel?”
• “Is there some course in law school now, how to be
discourteous and how to be rude? Because if there is,
you must have gotten an A in it.”
• “I’m glad you think it’s funny . . . . No wonder people
think lawyers are a disgrace. It’s people like you who
give them that impression.”
The judge argued that his courtroom demeanor “was justi-
fied by the circumstances, including the ‘rough and tumble’
nature of landlord-tenant litigation.” Disagreeing, the Court
explained:
[T]he need to maintain order must be counterbalanced
against a judge’s obligations to remain patient and to treat
those appearing before the court
with dignity and courtesy . . . .
As we have explained, “respect
for the judiciary is better fos-
tered by temperate conduct, not
hot-headed reactions” . . . .
LACK OF RESPECT
The New York Court of Appeals
removed a second judge for (1)
making discourteous, insensitive,
and undignified comments before counsel and litigants in
court; (2) driving while intoxicated, being discourteous to and
seeking preferred treatment from the arresting officers, violat-
ing the terms of her conditional discharge, and going to Thai-
land without notice to the court, resulting in the revocation of
her conditional discharge; and (3) failing to disqualify herself
from the arraignment of a former client and attempting to have
his case transferred in a manner that she thought might bene-
fit him.25
For example, the judge learned one day from her clerk that
an in-custody defendant the judge was scheduled to arraign
was biting, spitting, cursing, kicking, and punching sheriff’s
deputies, and using racial slurs while being transported to the
court. While awaiting the case, the judge said from the bench
to a sheriff’s deputy, “I heard she’s going crazy,” and “Well, tase
her”; “Shoot her?”; “What do you do, billy-club people?”;
“Well, punch her in the face and bring her out here. You can’t
take a 16-year-old?”; “What do you want me to do, leave her?
I don’t like her attitude;” “She needs a whoopin’“; and “Is she
crazy or is she bad?”
Another day, the judge arraigned a defendant charged with
disorderly conduct for intentionally blocking traffic by walk-
ing in the middle of the road. Before accepting his plea, the
judge told the defendant to “stay out of the street. It’s super
annoying. I hate when people walk in front of my car. If there
was [sic] no rules, I would totally run them over because it’s
disrespectful.”
Another time, the attorney for a man charged with misde-
meanor sexual misconduct objected to an order of protection
in favor of the alleged victim, referred to the alleged victim’s
three-week delay in signing a statement against D.W., and
stated, “It appears to me to be a case of buyer’s remorse.” The
judge laughed and told the assistant district attorney, “That
was funny. You didn’t think that was funny.” A minute or two
later, following D.W.’s arraignment, the judge stated: “Oh,
man. I don’t mean to be so inappropriate. I thought that was
freakin’ hilarious. . . . She [referring to the prosecutor] didn’t
think it was funny. . . . She was offended. I thought it was hilar-
ious.”
The Court held that the judge’s repeated failure to speak in
a dignified manner with defendants, sheriff’s deputies, and
attorneys demonstrated a lack of “respect toward everyone
who appears in a court.”
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26. In the Matter of Wright, 194 A.3d 495 (New Jersey 2018), adopt-
ing the presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Con-
duct, available at https://tinyurl.com/y7xgg3zf. 
27. In the Matter of Palmer, 196 A.3d 579 (New Jersey 2018), adopt-
ing the presentment of the Advisory Committee on Judicial Con-
duct, available at https://tinyurl.com/y7gcb8qb.
28. In the Matter of DeAvila-Silebi, 194 A.3d 497 (New Jersey 2018),
based on the report of a three-judge panel, available at
https://tinyurl.com/ybmp3fal.
29. See, e.g., U.S. Advisory Opinion 114 (2014), available at
https://tinyurl.com/y3t8jhgl. See also Gray, “The Judge as Author,”
35 JUDICIAL CONDUCT REPORTER 1 (spring 2013).
30. In re Steigman (Illinois Courts Commission, August 13, 2018),
available at https://tinyurl.com/y9u3gkxt. 
grandmother and returned to police headquarters with the
child and the mother, after which the mother left with the
child. Judge DeAvila-Silebi also “demonstrated dishonesty, per-
version of her judicial authority and betrayal of the public
trust” by making numerous misrepresentations to the police
department. For example, contrary to what she told the police
sergeant, she had not received a phone call from an attorney,
no emergent application had been filed, and she had not seen
the court order regarding parenting time.
Probably the biggest contrasts between the three cases that
justified escalating sanctions from reprimand to censure to
removal were the aggravating and mitigating factors.
In Wright, there were no aggravating factors justifying more
than a reprimand, and the mitigating factors included the
judge’s sincere remorse and contrition, which had demon-
strated to the Committee that the likelihood of her repeating
the misconduct was “nearly nonexistent.”
In Palmer, the Committee concluded that “enhanced disci-
pline” was justified because this was the third time in three
years that the judge had been the subject of discipline. In mit-
igation, the Committee noted that that the judge had not
intended to influence the court staff he spoke to and “there was
no indication that they were actually influenced.”
In contrast, in DeAvila-Silebi, during the disciplinary pro-
ceedings, the judge “not only failed to acknowledge her
wrongdoing or express remorse or contrition” but “displayed
additional dishonesty and transcended her right to present a
defense.” The panel emphasized that the judge’s “‘disturbing’
decision to perpetuate a defense without any ‘compunction
about being less than credible’ as the investigation of her con-
duct continued, ‘evidence[s] that [she] lacks the honor and
integrity demanded of a judge.’” 
PRESTIGIOUS PROMOTIONS
There are numerous judicial ethics advisory opinions on
whether and to what extent judges may use their judicial titles
to promote permitted extra-judicial activities such as writing
books.29 If they had sought an opinion or at least reviewed
existing advice, two judges may have avoided sanctions for
misuse of their positions in 2018.
The Illinois Courts Commission publicly reprimanded an
appellate judge for soliciting paid speaking engagements
using his judicial position, finding he not only lent the pres-
tige of office to advance his private interests, but exploited his
judicial office in financial and business dealings, engaged in
financial and business dealings with persons likely to come
before his court, and played an active role in managing a busi-
ness.30 The Commission stated that it was not finding that the
judge’s misconduct was willful but noted it was “frankly puz-
zled” that he had never sought guidance from available
ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE
In 2018 the New Jersey
Supreme Court had three cases
involving judges who had
improperly used the prestige of
their office to try to influence
official action in their favor or in
favor of a friend. 
• In In the Matter of Wright, the Court publicly repri-
manded a judge who had involved herself in the
scheduling and processing of a friend’s custody case.26
• In In the Matter of Palmer, the Court publicly censured
a judge (a harsher sanction than reprimand) for iden-
tifying himself as a judge to court personnel when
discussing his own family law case.27
• In In the Matter of DeAvila-Silebi, the Court removed
a judge who had involved herself in a former intern’s
custody dispute.28
(The Court’s orders do not describe the judges’ misconduct;
this discussion is based on findings by the Advisory Commit-
tee on Judicial Conduct or a three-judge panel.)
The imposition of three different sanctions in cases involv-
ing violations of the same rules is attributable in part to differ-
ences in the nature and extent of the misconduct. 
Judge Wright had escorted a friend seeking temporary cus-
tody of his grandson to the court’s intake office, talked to court
personnel to ensure her friend had the right forms, asked the
judge on emergent duty about the schedule, and then told a
staff member that her friend could return on Monday.
Judge Palmer had appeared at the Somerset County Court-
house, identified himself several times as a judge from Ocean
County, and asked about how to emancipate his child and how
to lower his child support payments. He spoke in succession to
a clerk, a caseworker, a senior probation officer (after the case-
worker asked for assistance), and the senior probation officer’s
supervisor (after the senior probation officer asked for assis-
tance). When talking to the caseworker’s supervisor, for exam-
ple, the judge referred to his lack of a pay raise, remarking
“you the tax payers decided that a long time ago.” The judge’s
conduct was “sufficiently disruptive and disconcerting” that a
supervisor told the Somerset County assignment judge, who
reported the incident to the Ocean County assignment judge. 
Judge DeAvila-Silebi called the police the day before
Mother’s Day, identified herself as the emergent duty judge,
and told a sergeant she wanted an officer to accompany a
mother to retrieve her child. The police department dispatched
an officer with the mother to the home of the child’s paternal
grandmother; the officer took the five-year-old boy from his
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31. In re Roach, Judgment and public admonition (Texas Special
Court of Review, July 24, 2018), available at https://tinyurl.com/
yc4j7gpo.
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sources such as “prior decisions of this Commission (some of
which relate to the conduct of business by judges) and the
excellent advisory opinions produced by the Illinois Judges
Association’s committee on judicial ethics,” several of which
were on relevant topics. 
The judge testified that he had been writing and speaking
on legal topics for decades to share his love of the law and to
educate the public. He began soliciting paid speaking opportu-
nities after an organizer of continuing legal education seminars
for prosecutors offered to pay him $1,250 for a two-day pre-
sentation. The judge’s income was $32,000 to $34,000 for over
24 presentations over two years.
The judge made over 120 solicitations. The judge used judi-
cial letterhead for most of his solicitations to law enforcement
groups. The judge initially sent solicitations to medical soci-
eties and hospitals by his work e-mail but switched to judicial
letterhead after the response to the e-mail solicitation had been
“tepid.” If he did not receive a response, he sometimes fol-
lowed up by telephone. He had his secretary assist him with
the letters and e-mail solicitations by dictating them for her to
transcribe as he would any other correspondence. He paid all
the postage for the letters himself.
Noting that the code prohibits judges from soliciting dona-
tions for charitable organizations, the Commission stated
that, “[t]he same principles apply with even greater force
when the ‘cause’ for which the judge is soliciting is a business
or commercial activity that serves the judge’s own financial
benefit.” The Commission found that the judge’s use of sta-
tionery and other judicial resources to advance his “burgeon-
ing speaking business was an exploitation of his judicial
office” It explained:
Respondent pursued the opportunity to give paid pre-
sentations on the law with energy, using judicial letter-
head stationery to increase the likelihood of a positive
response to his solicitations and making follow-up calls
to recipients who had not responded. Respondent’s zeal
in this pursuit arose primarily from his genuine belief
that he was providing a public benefit by explaining legal
concepts to non-lawyers. Nevertheless, while his
motives may have been pure, the fact that the “public
service” he was providing also enriched him financially
created the danger that recipients of his solicitation
might feel coerced to hire him, or might think that hiring
him to give a presentation would cause him to favor their
interests in cases that came before him.
The Commission agreed that merely being paid to speak or
teach may not constitute actively managing a business and
emphasized that it was not criticizing or trying to inhibit the
practice of judges educating the public regarding the law. How-
ever, it concluded that, by directly soliciting paid speaking
engagements and following up to urge reluctant recipients to
hire him, the judge “went beyond simply earning a fee for per-
mitted activity, and instead
actively sought to increase his
extrajudicial sources of rev-
enues.”
PROJECT PROMOTION
A Special Court of Review
appointed by the Texas Supreme
Court publicly admonished a
judge for referring to his judicial
title and position to promote a
project that included a book, website, and an online referral ser-
vice.31 The judge and his wife, an attorney who conducts medi-
ations in family law cases, co-authored the book Divorce in
Peace: Alternatives to War from a Judge and Lawyer. The book’s
front cover lists “John and Laura Roach” as authors. The back
cover has a photo of the authors together, next to the statement:
“John and Laura have spent their careers, as lawyers and a
judge, trying to help couples avoid the pitfalls of high conflict
divorces.” An “About the Authors” section describes John
Roach as “a Texas district court judge with a true passion for the
law” and states that, “[a]s a judge, he has had a front row seat
to over 10,000 family law cases.” The book’s text does not refer
to “Judge John Roach” or “Judge Roach,” but the book has sec-
tions titled “Judge’s Perspective” and “Mediator’s Perspective”
that offer additional comment on particular topics.
The book’s introduction refers to the “attorneys, financial
planners, mental health professionals and others who are
committed to the same principles of peaceful resolution” and
“are listed at our website, www.divorceinpeace.com.” Profes-
sionals could be listed on the website without charge with a
photo, resumé, practice-area description, and e-mail address.
Professionals who chose a subscription option, which ranged
from $59.99 a month to $199 a month, could post additional
information such as client reviews, blog posts, articles, and
videos.
When the book was published, a brochure was mailed to
approximately 18,000 recipients, including about 12,000 Texas
attorneys listed with the State Bar as family law practitioners.
The brochure repeated the website address several times and
described the benefits for attorneys who paid fees to subscribe
to the network. 
A series of promotional videos were made for the project.
For example, in one video, titled “About Us,” the judge and his
wife were featured with a picture of a gavel; the judge dis-
cussed his expertise as an elected state district court judge who
has presided over 10,000 family law cases. The judge decided
not to use the videos after viewing them because he was con-
cerned that portions may violate the canons. However, the
videos were available on the website for approximately 30 days
and were still accessible on YouTube as of May 2018. Accord-
ing to the judge, he had been unsuccessful in his repeated
efforts to remove the videos from YouTube because he did not
have the necessary user name and password and could not
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obtain the information from the production company in India
that had helped to create the videos.
Describing a spectrum, the court explained that, at one end,
“are plainly impermissible situations involving a judge who
directly uses his or her authority over litigants to coerce
actions that will benefit the judge financially.” At the other end
of the spectrum, the court stated, “judges are permitted to
write and publish books on legal and non-legal topics; identify
themselves as judges in biographical descriptions; and sell
books they have written so long as they do not exploit the judi-
cial title in doing so.”
The court concluded that “[t]his case falls in the middle of
the spectrum” because the judge did not direct “coercive con-
duct towards litigants or attorneys appearing in his court to
compel actions from which he stood to benefit financially”
but the “circumstances involve more than individual sales of
a law-related book written by a judge.” The court acknowl-
edged that there was no reference to the judge as “Judge John
Roach” or “Judge Roach” in the book or in the referral service
brochure and no evidence the judge was photographed in his
robe in connection with the book and website. However, it
stated that his “judicial role is readily apparent based on the
first eight words of the book’s ‘About the Authors’ section”
and “[l]ittle effort is required for readers to discern that the
‘Judge’ referenced on the front and back covers is John Roach,
and that the ‘Judge’s Perspective’ highlighted throughout the
book comes from him.” The court described the project as
“structured to create a financial gain arising from attorneys
who paid for subscriptions in hopes of being hired by readers
who acted on the book’s multiple invitations to visit the web-
site and find Divorce in Peace-affiliated attorneys.” The court
concluded that the judge’s “participation in aspects of this
interconnected project” improperly exploited his judicial
position in business activities. 
CONCLUSION
Many judicial discipline cases each year involve a pattern of
egregious behavior aggravated by lack of remorse that most
judges have trouble imagining. Other cases, however, start with
a small slip or blind spot that judges may find uncomfortably
more relatable. To ensure their ethics radars are sufficiently sen-
sitive, judges should re-read the code of judicial conduct at least
annually, take advantage of the resources of their state judicial
ethics advisory committees, and review information from other
states as ethical standards are the same in significant respects
across the country. For example, every quarter, the Center for
Judicial Ethics of the National Center for State Courts publishes
the online Judicial Conduct Reporter, with articles on recent
cases and advisory opinions and analysis of issues such as
“Judicial ethics and jurors” and “A judge’s discretion to report
criminal conduct” (both in the spring 2019 issue);32 “Consen-
sual sexual relationships between judges and court staff”;
“Pornography at the courthouse”; and “Vouching for pardon,
parole, or clemency” (from the fall 2018 issue).33 The Center
also has a blog with posts every Tuesday on new cases, advisory
opinions, or other developments, and Throwback Thursdays,
with summaries of discipline cases from 25, 20, 10, and 5 years
ago.34 Reading about others’ missteps may help judges navigate
ethically when almost everything they do has the potential for
a cringe-worthy headline.
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aja journey to cuba
february 17-22, 2020
(with optional extension to February 24)
The AJA invites you and your guest(s) to join our private delegation for an eye-
opening journey at this most pivotal time in U.S.-Cuba relations. Our specially 
designed program will explore Cuba’s rich and varied cultural heritage. We 
will go beyond tourist corridors by engaging with local scholars, attorneys, 
musicians and artists who will oer in-depth commentary on the Cuban legal 
system, art, history, architecture, and religion.
We have teamed with Cuba Cultural Travel to create this extraordinary trip. 
Our private journeys (space is limited) include the following: 
• Thought-provoking lectures by renowned scholars and legal experts 
• Private performances and reception by prominent dance companies 
and musicians
• Exploration of the fascinating neighborhoods of Havana in the company 
of an architect and historian
To request a brochure and registration information, please email Shelley 
Rockwell at srockwell@ncsc.org.
CUSTOM DESIGNED PROGRAM INCLUDES
• Itinerary design and coordination
• Compliance with US Treasury Department
• 5 Star Hotel Melia Cohiba
Extension includes Hotel Melia San Carlos Cienfuegos
• All ground transportation
• Full time private tour escort
• Daily breakfast in Cuba
• Airport transfer to/from Havana airport
• Meals as listed in itinerary (including tips)
• Entrance fees to museums etc.
• Bottled water on bus and in room
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• Cuban Tourist Card/Visa
EXCLUDES
• Airfare to/from Cuba
• Airline baggage fees
• Gratuities for guide and driver
• Individualized hotel expenses (mini bar, room service, laundry fees, etc)
• Trip cancellation insurance
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February 17-22, 2020
Double Occupancy (per person):  $3,375
Single Occupancy: $3,710
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Double Occupancy (per person):  $4,575
Single Occupancy: $5,110
Organized by:
The new Justice Systems, now an Ontario Systems company, is 
serving up a new approach to managing cases beginning to end 
with efficiency and compliance. 
Now in one technology suite, you’ll get enhanced technology to 
improve your court case management operations, handle online 
payments, and automate your revenue recovery processes, 
allowing you to recover more revenue with the resources you 
already have.
To learn more, visit JusticeSystems.com.
FullCourt Enterprise® | CitePay USA™ | RevQ+®
JusticeSystems.com | 800.283.3227
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16
17 18 19
20 21 22 23
24 25 26 27 28
29 30 31
32 33 34
35 36 37 38 39
40 41 42
43 44 45 46 47
48 49
50 51 52 53 54
55 56 57 58 59 60
61 62 63
64 65 66
Across
1 Set forth
6 First-aid kit roll
10 Shade close to cyan
14 Little Pigs number
15 Reuner, for short
16 Rhode Island s motto
17 Duffer's dream
18 One of Columbus's fleet
19 Pay to play
20 Becoming enraptured
22 Garfield or Felix
24 2017 John Grisham novel
29 Region of Spain
31 Food court hanger-outer
32 Place for un chapeau
33 Center of a peach
34 Debits' opp.
35 2017 John Grisham novel
40 ___ Tai (rum cocktail)
41 Use a pan
42 Money in Marseilles
43 Napes
46 Here ___
48 2018 John Grisham novel
50 Noisy commotion
51 Pointy-nosed animal
55 Popular houseplant
58 Sister of Maggie and Bart
60 ___ hitch (kind of knot)
61 He sold his birthright to Jacob
62 European car make
BAR CALLS by Judge Victor Fleming
55 Turk topper
56 That Cuban?
57 Cardi B's music
59 Wall St. event
63 Asian nation
64 Hits with a laser beam
65 Historical seamstress
66 "Terrific!"
Down
1 Fr. religious figures
2 Begin to melt
3 Jason's boat
4 Move to a new home
5 High schooler
6 Astringent used in dyeing
7 Straighten out
8 Word play unit
9 Waste away
10 "___ Be the Day"
11 Long period of time
12 Well-chosen, as a phrase
13 Jamie ___ Curtis of cinema
21 Cyber "seems to me"
23 Syst. of unspoken words
25 Neglect to include
26 Triple Crown jockey Eddie
27 Like a one-lane bridge
28 Drying-out woe, for short
29 Append
30 Put on the payroll again
33 K-pop superstar
36 In bad taste
37 Ural River city
38 Jeff Foxworthy subjects
39 One-story cottage
40 Dec. hrs. in Denver
44 Neighbor of Saturn
45 Provided meals to
46 Chronological records
47 Coll. cagers' contest
49 Caravan stopovers
52 Came apart
53 Knievel of stunts
54 ___ estate
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 67.
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FEATURED BOOKS 
ABOUT FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment Handbook, 3rd
Ed. by William W. Greenhalg (American
Bar Association 2010)
First written by a renowned George-
town Law Center professor, this volume
can be a handy reference and instruction
booklet for all Fourth Amendment issues
and cases. It contains summaries of all
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment deci-
sions through 2009. The book also fea-
tures an alphabetized table of cases, a
chronological table of cases by case name
and other identifying information, a con-
ceptual index of various doctrines, a
Supreme Court roster from 1914 through
2009, and an indication of cases that have
been overruled
Making Sense of Search and Seizure Law
by Phillip A. Hubbart (Carolina Acade-
mic Press 2005)
If you find the need to understand
more about the history, background, and
precedent of the Fourth Amendment,
then this 2005 book will be helpful and
concise. The stated reason for the study is
to make sense of the Fourth Amendment,
that is, to render it understandable and
coherent in a single volume. In addition,
the book contains helpful summaries of
judicial interpretation and construction
that can enhance a judge’s reading of
Fourth Amendment cases, and facilitate a
better understanding.
o
HELPFUL FOURTH AMENDMENT LINKS
National Constitution Center – Fourth
Amendment
https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/amendments/amendment-iv 
This Philadelphia educational nonprofit
provides multiple platforms and
resources to support civil and legal edu-
cation about the Constitution and all its
Amendments. Its Trustees include Justice
Neil Gorsuch, former Sen. Joe Biden,
former Gov. Jeb Bush, former President
Bill Clinton, and retired Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor. This link leads to two
essays from eminent law professors about
the Fourth Amendment.
American Bar Association–Telephone
Technology
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/judi-
cial/publications/judges_journal/2016/spr
ing/telephone_technology_versus_the_fo
urth_amendment/
A former Chair of the ABA’s National Con-
ference of State Trial Judges, Judge Herbert
B. Dixon, Jr., wrote this excellent review of
telephone technology and Fourth Amend-
ment issues. The history is traced and the
explanations are clear. The important cases
are listed and explained. This serves as a
very helpful resource for judges.
Hiding In Plain Sight: A Fourth Amend-
ment Framework for Analyzing Govern-
ment Surveillance In Public—law review
article 
http://law.emory.edu/elj/_documents/
volumes/66/3/levinson-waldman.pdf
Delving deeper into “digital age public
surveillance technologies,” this 2017 law
review article comes from an established
author from the Brennan Center at NYU
to try to answer the question, “How is the
judiciary to adapt traditional Fourth
Amendment concepts to the Govern-
ment’s modern, more sophisticated inves-
tigative tools?”
2018 Fourth Amendment Cases
https : / /www.pol iceone .com/2018-
review/articles/482335006-SCOTUS-year-
in-review-A-quartet-of-Fourth-Amend-
ment-cases/
Police.One is an online law and informa-
tion resource for law enforcement officers.
This 2018 article was written by a lawyer
and former police officer to list notable
search and seizure cases from that year. It
includes four cases that we may not have
otherwise heard about, and is a concise
explanation of legal issues.
Fourth Amendment Cases and Citations 
http://www.fourthamendment.com/
ccl.php
Fourthamendment.com is an author’s
“online supplement” to a Lexis book pub-
lished about the Fourth Amendment.
This link purports to list all Fourth
Amendment cases alphabetically, but the
site in general is a plethora of info, quotes,
resources, links and lists regarding all
things Fourth Amendment.
WANT TO READ MORE ABOUT DOG-
SNIFF SEARCHES, OR JUST DOGS?
Who’s a Good Boy? U.S. Supreme Court
Again Considers Whether Dog Sniffs
Are Searches (Justia.com)
https://verdict.justia.com/2019/01/16/wh
os-a-good-boy-us-supreme-court-consid-
ers -aga in-whether-dog-sni f f s -are -
searches
This is a good parallel piece to our feature
article this issue about dog-sniff searches.
The author is a law professor that writes
clearly and concisely for Verdict, a com-
mentary feature of Justia.com., a large
legal information clearinghouse. The arti-
cle frames the arguments well regarding
dog-sniff cases in the U.S. Supreme Court
now and yet to come.
The Dog Days Are Over: Terry Stops,
Traffic Stops, and Dog Sniffs After
Rodriquez (The Federal Lawyer,Oct/Nov
2015)
http://www.fedbar.org/Resources_1/Feder
al-Lawyer-Magazine/2015/October/
Features /The-Dog-Days-Are-Over-
emTerryem-Stops-Traffic-Stops-and-Dog-
Sniffs-After-emRodriguezem.aspx?
FT=.pdf
From The Federal Lawyer, the periodical
of the Federal Bar Association, this suc-
cinct 2015 article discusses the ramifica-
tions of the then-recent Rodriquez v. U.S.
case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
held police may not prolong traffic stops
to wait for a dog sniff absent other prob-
able cause (also highlighted in our fea-
ture article this issue on dog-sniff
searches).
The Resource Page
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